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MATRIMONIAL CONSENT IN CANON LAW 
JURIDICAL ASPECTS 
Roberto Rosas* 
I. Introduction 
A valid marriage emerges to existence thanks to the founding power of one 
sole efficient cause - consent. 
With clarity and detem1ination, Canon 1057 Section 1 indicates: "The consent 
of the parties, legitimately manifested between persons qualified by law, makes 
marriage; no human power is able to supply consent. " 1 
The title of this miicle "Matrimonial Consent in Canon Law", is one of great 
interest and significance in the judicial praxis, jurisprudence and in the marriage 
doctrine. 
To initiate, lets us remember the principle of common sense and experience: 
"One can only give that which is owned", which is applied to introduce us to consent. 
In effect, according to Canon 1057 Section 2: "lvfatrimonial consent is an act 
of the will by which a man and a 1vonwn mutually give and accept each other through 
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an irrevocable covenant in order to establish marriage. "2 We understand that the 
consent of each contracting party consists of an act of will through which both "give 
and accept" each other. 
And having to consider consent as a human, intelligent and free act, which 
also, has as its object the establishment of a marriage and which does not limit itself 
to a present obligation, but rather, serves to establish a commitment for a future life. 
This leads us to take up again the commentaries made regarding the text of St. 
Ignatius Loyola in his celebrated Spiritual Exercises: "First let's draw our attention 
to the fact that love has "two parts", which are "the person giving love and the 
person receiving love". (With "two parts" referring to two individuals, who tend to 
have only one love: duo in corde uno (two in one heart)."3 
In consent, utilizing as our starting point the freedom of will, man makes use of 
what is exclusively his: conscience and reflexion. Teilhard de Chardin, pointing out 
that conscience is co-applicable to life,4 asserts that reflection is a "psychological 
characteristic of a being, that not only knows, but knows that he knows."5 
These briefly explained fundamentals will serve to explain, throughout this 
essay, the following sections: · 
1. The concept of marriage, starting from its historical definitions in order to 
finally arrive at what is established in the current Code of Canon Law. 
2. The contractual and non-contractual theories of marriage. 
3. The basic principle of matrimonial consent. 
4. The nature of consent. 
5. Acts that lead to the formation of consent 
6. Reflections on the nullity of marriage centered on Canons 1057 and 1095. 
As a way of specifying the content of this essay, we need to consider that 
within the common Canon Law there exist two regulations to the discipline of 
marriage; one applicable to the Latin Church and found, in its essential rules, in the 
Code of Canon Law enacted on January 25, 1983 (Canons 1055-1165), and the 
second existing in the Church of Eastern rite, whose discipline is found in the Codex 
canonum Ecclesiarum orie11talimenacted on October 18, 1990 (Canons 776-866). 
The purpose of this work, for obvious reasons, is limited to the study of the Law, in 
force, in the Latin Church without excluding the possibility of making reference, of 
some kind, to the Eastern regime if it be necessary. 
2Jd. 
3 Ignasio Casanovas, Segunda Nota: "De las obras de amor", Ejercicios de San Ignacio, Tomos V-
VI, Comentario y explicaci6n de los ejericios espirituales de San Ignacio de Loyola (S.I., Editorial 
Balmes 1948). 
4 Claude Tresmontant, Jntroducci6n a! pensamiento de Teilhard de Chardin (El fenomeno humano) 
36 (Taurus Ediciones.l968). 
5 Piene Teilhard de Chardin, La R~flexi6n DeL' Ene1gie 483. 
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I would like to invite you to join me, through this intellectual expedition, in 
discovering, along a path of study of the previously mentioned sections, the road 
towards the terra incognita - the most promising words that have ever been written 
in plotting the maps of human knowledge-, as Daniel Boors tin mentions in his work 
The Discoverers.6 And this unknown territory is the complete understanding of 
matrimonial canonical consent. 
Now, if we look at marriage through the eyes of the religious poetry, marriage is 
the great symbol of the mystic life. Marriage (along with the night and the flame) is one 
the three dominant symbols in the works of Saint Juan de la Cruz, the mystical doctor, 
one of the poets who resorts to the symbol and the allegory. The three symbols together 
provide the tone and the atmosphere of the mystical world: night represents significance; 
maniage, communion oflove; and the flame, change and life. In other words, "the symbol 
of the flame is the brooch and the culmination of the fervor ofthe consummated love in 
marriage and is the perfect gradual illumination of the dark night. "7 
Even though this work is aimed at all those interested in the study of matrimonial 
canon law (scholars, lawyers, students), its focus is primarily aimed at those who 
spend their lives in the Church tribunals dedicated to working with the matrimonial 
causes to aid God's people.; as well as for those who wait, with hope and anxiety, 
for these tribunals to alleviate their suffering, allowing them to mend their broken 
lives. For the benefit ofthelatter, let us remember what Carnelutti said should appear 
in every tribunal: Justice and Peace, so that the conflicting parties can leave with a 
feeling of justice and peace, the judges applying at every moment the canonical 
equity and the "salus animarum" as the supreme law of the Church. And with the 
salvation of the souls, Canon 1752, as the last canon, ends with dignity the Code of 
Canon Law. 
This article is the fruit of20 continuous years ofupdated study of matrimonial 
Canon Law, with years of collaboration in ecclesiastical tribunals on the development 
of the matrimonial processes in causes of matrimonial nullity, as well as giving 
lectures on Canon Law. This article combines my own reflections with research, 
especially the works of distinguished canonist. Obviously, the wo1'ks of the great 
minds of the Catholic Church have influenced my view on the topic, I alone remain 
accountable for the material I have written. 
I. Marriage 
A. Etimologies 
Earlier writers derived the word marriage from the word "mater" (mother) and 
"munium" (occupation) fonnulating the word "Matrismunus" which was translated 
6 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Discoverer 12 (Random House 1983). 
7 San Juan de la Cruz, Obra Poetica 23 (Miguel de Santiago Ediciones 29 1977). 
- --- ---------------------------------------
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into "the occupation of the mother". 8 The use of the word "mater" stemmed from 
the belief that the infant depended more on the mother than on the father; the latter 
having as his occupation to acquire and preserve those goods necessary for the support 
of the family. 9 The word wedding comes from the Latin verb mibere which means to 
cover with a veil; thus, the tradition that a woman covers herself in a veil during a 
wedding. 10 The Latin word conubium (marriage) represent the sharing of the same 
veil by both spouses; thus, symbolizing the union that is to last for a lifetime. 11 The 
Latin word coniungo, which means yoke, represents the mutual sharing of the yoke 
by both male and female. 12 Finally, the Latin word consortium, which means 
participation, represents the participation or the sharing of the same luck, of a common 
destiny by both male and female. 13 
B. RomanLaw 
Under Roman Law, marriage was given tWo distinct definitions both of which 
became universally accepted and remain in existence today. The first definition, 
found in the Justinian Code, defined marriage as the union between a male and a 
female, creating an inseparable bond for life. 14 Note the incorporation of the word 
"bond" prior to "for life" in the definition obtained from Justinian Code. ·It is 
interesting to note how at such an early time in civilization, marriage was already 
seen as a bond that tied the man and the woman together for life. As many theologians 
have stated, the word bond (consuetudinem in Latin) is at the core of marital life 
given that this element is what separates this type of relationship from others and is 
what allows both man and woman to mutually surrei1der their friendship, trust and 
love by way of an earthly union. 15 
The second definition is that of Modestino, which is found in the Digest and 
was received by the Eastem Churches. 16 The translation ofthe definition is as follows: 
A wedding is the union of man and woman and an agreement that is to last for a 
lifetime, the communication of the divine and the human law. 17 Some commentators 
believe that the last phrase of the definition refers to the cmmnunication of the intimate 
and the temporary things. 18 
8 Carlos Warnholtz Bustillos, Manual de Derecho Matrimonial Canonico 23 (Universidad Pontificia 
de Mexico 1996). 
9 !d. 
10 !d. 
II !d. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. 
14 !d. 
15 !d. at 24. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. 
18 !d. 
2009] MATRIMONIAL CoNSENT IN CANON LAW JuRIDICAL AsrEcrs 423 
B. Early Christian Formulations 
i. St. Augustine and the Three Goods of Marriage 
St. Augustine argued that there exist three goods in a marriage: procreation 
(proles), chastity (fides) and the bond of union (sacramentum). 19 For St. Augustine, 
human beings were created in order to be bound together by some kind of bond of 
friendship, by which the highest expression of this relationship was marriage. 20 Thus, 
Augustine felt that marriage and the sexual joining of man and woman was something 
good because it created a union by which man and women would walk on a similar 
path planning and cooperating together. 21 
The second good that St. Augustine identified in marriage was fides or the 
loyalty of one spouse toward the other.22 As St. Augustine reasoned, woman and 
man do not have power over their bodies individually, but rather each has power 
over the body of the other.23 And it was this power that Augustine felt was clear 
evidence of the extreme loyalty that married individuals must show for each other. 24 
A loyalty so strong, that the betrayal of such was considered, by St. Augustine, as 
the disowning of one's body.25 
The third good identified by St. Augustine was the bond of union.26 For St. 
Augustine, marriage was a lifelong unity that was not to be undone by the personal 
judgments of the individual. 27 It was a sacramental bond that represented the source 
and symbol of a pennanent union among Christians. 28 Thus, even if a married couple 
were unable to procreate, because of sterility, it would be unlawful for them to separate 
and unite with someone else for the sake of having children.29 By arguing so, St. 
Augustine furthered his argument that the purpose of marriage dealt with more than 
just procreation given that it also represented a natural companionship between the 
individuals. 
l9 John Witte, Jr., Propter Honoris Respectum: The Goods and Goals a,( Marriage, 76 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1019, 1030 (200 1) (citing St. Augustine, The Good Of Marriage, Translated in St. Augustine: 
Treatises on Marriage and Other Subject 3, 17 (Roy J. Deferrar ed. 1955)). 
2° Charles Reid, Symposium: The Augustinian Goods o.f !11arriage: The Disappearing Comers tone o.l 
the American Law ofMarriage, 18 BYU J. Pub. L. 449, 452 (2004) (citing St. Augustine, De Bono 
Coniugali, De Sancta Virginitate 2 (P.G. Walsh, ed., 2001)). 
21 !d. 
22 Charles Reid, supra n. 20. 
23 !d. 
24 ld. 
25 !d. 
26 John Witte, supra n. 19. 
27 Charles Reid, supra n. 20. 
28 John Witte, supra n. 19 (citing Augustine, On !11arriage and Concupiscence, translated in A Select 
Library ofNicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church at 263, 268). 
29 !d. (citing Augustine, The Good of Marriage, translated in St. Augustine: Treatise onlvfarriage and 
Other Subjects 3, 31-32 (Roy J. Deferrari ed., 1955)). 
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ii. The Roman Catholic Church and St. Thomas Aquinas 
The Papal Revolution (1075-1300) brought about an enormous transfonnation 
and important changes within the society, culture and politics of the Western 
Hemisphere. It was also during this time that St. Thomas Aquinas defended and 
elaborated on the three goods of marriage first set out by St. Augustine. 30 In 
elaborating on the three marital goods, St. Aquinas brought about a greater 
clarification as to the priority of each one and also effectively argued that marriage 
was a three dimensional institution with each of the marital goods anchored to one 
of the three dimensions.31 Furthermore, in his work Summa Theologieae, St. Aquinas 
discussed the virtuousness of marital sex and how sexual behavior was not necessarily 
a sin.32 In doing so, St. Aquinas expanded on the definition of marriage by addressing 
a topic that had long been revered as immoral and sinful, even within a marriage. 33 
St. Aquinas argued that if marriage was seen as a natural institution, procreation 
was its primmy purpose. 34 While sharing the perspective of St. Augustine, that man 
and woman have a natural inclination to come together for the purpose of having 
children; St. Aquinas argued that procreation meant more than just the act of 
conceiving children.35 Procreation also meant the rearing and educating of children 
in the spiritual and temporallife.36 And it was this latter component of procreation 
that St. Aquinas argued could not be achieved simply through the licit union of 
husband and wife and their engagement in sexual intercourse. 37 Husband and wife, 
Thomas argued, had the requirement of maintain a faithful, permanent and stable 
union if the children were to be reared and educated accordingly. 38 By elaborating 
the marital good of proles, to include the rearing and educating of children, St. Aquinas 
placed top priority on the primary marital good of procreation; placing the secondary 
goods as faith and sacramental stability.39 
On the other hand, if marriage was seen as a contractual association, then faith 
(fides) was to be considered the primary good ofmarriage.4° For St. Aquinas, marital 
faith was a faith of justice and not a spiritual faith. 41 What this meant was maintaining 
30 John Witte, supra n. 19, at 1035. 
31 Id. 
32 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation (Timothy McDermott ed., 
Ave Maria Press I 989). 
33 Id. at 561. 
34 John Witte, supra n. 19, at 35. 
35 ld. 
36Jd. 
37 Id. 
38Jd. 
39 ld. (citing Summa Theologica 2724, 2725-2729 (Fathers of the Eng. Dominican Province 
trans.1948)). 
40 ld. 
41 I d. (citing Summa Theologica 2724, 2725-2729 (Fathers of the Eng. Dominican Province trans., 
1948)). 
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faith in the promises made in the contractual marriage as well as remaining faithful.42 
Furthermore, marital faith not only required one to abstain from engaging in sexual 
intercourse with another, but also involved a commitment to be indissolubly united, 
both in body and mind, with one's spouse willing to remain best friends and share 
fully in the property, lineage and reputation.43 Marital faith, in this broader sense, 
was a good in itself that extended the contractual association between husband and 
wife in youth and old age, in prosperity and adversity and in sickness and in health. 44 
Thus, St. Aquinas argued, if marriage was seen as a contractual association then the 
procreation of children was not necessarily expected or intended.45 Furthermore, if 
a promise to many was consummated faithfully, sexual intercourse was a good act 
in itself, including those instances where procreation was a natural impossibility.46 
By viewing marriage in a contractual sense, St. Aquinas categorized the marital 
good of faith (fides) as the primary good of marriage, with sacrament and procreation 
as the secondary goods ofmarriage.47 
Finally, St. Aquinas argued that if marriage was seen as a spiritual institution, 
the primary marital good was sacramentum.48 A properly contracted sacramental 
marriage, between Christians, fell within the laws of the Church and nature, was an 
indissoluble union and a channel of grace.49 Thomas furthered argued that through 
the sacrament, a grace was conferred upon those manying and through this grace 
they were brought in union with Christ and the Church. 50 By way of this grace, 
husband and wife were to remain united with Christ and the Church during their 
mortal existence. 51 Given that the union of husband and wife is representative of the 
union of Christ and the Church, St. Aquinas argued that the union was to last into 
perpetuity and that it was a union of one to the other. 52 Unlike St. Augustine, St. 
Aquinas did not considered marriage a sacrament only to demonstrate its symbolic 
stability, but rather to demonstrate its spititual efficacy. 53 Thus, St. Aquinas considered 
marriage to be indissoluble because it was a sacrament which elevated the goods of 
faith and procreation. 54 It is important to understand that out of the seven sacraments 
of the church, St. Aquinas believed the sacrament of the Eucharist to be the most 
42Jd. 
43 ld. at 1036 (citing John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal The01y 143-54 (1998)). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (citing Summa Theologica 2724, 2703-06 (Fathers of the Eng. Dominican Province trans., 
1948)). 
47Jd. 
48 Id. 
49 I d. at 1037 (200 1) (citing St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 295-96 (Vemon Bourke et 
al. trans., 1975)). 
so Id. 
51Jd. 
52Jd. 
53 ld. 
54 ld. at 1038 
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important of all given that "it contains the substance of Christ himself whereas the 
others contain a sort of instrumental power deriving from him". 55 Furthermore, St. 
Aquinas argued that all of the other six remaining sacraments prepared an individual 
for the sacrament of the Eucharist. 56 Thus, when looking at marriage as a spiritual 
institution, St. Aquinas reconciled his view that the sacrament of the Eucharist was 
the most important one and that of the sacrament of marriage by arguing that marriage 
was symbolically related to the Eucharist as a sign of the union, expressed by the 
Eucharist that existed between Christ and the church. 57 St. Aquinas believed that 
through the sacrament of marriage, parties consented to be bound to each other to 
. . ' 
the Church and to God; thereby, accepting the sacramental grace of God and the 
spiritual nurtur~ of the Church. 58 
Continuing in the expansion of the definition of marriage and particularly 
addressing the topic of sex, St. Aquinas presented the distinction between virginity 
(moral integrity) and how virginity seeks the soul's good through a life of 
contemplation attentive of the things of God while marriage seeks the body's good 
or the multiplying of the human race through an active life where husband and wife 
are attentive of the things of the world. 59 Moreover, St. Aquinas believed that sex, 
carried out in an orderly fashion and for its purpose of procreation, was not a sin. 60 
For St. Aquinas, the high degree of pleasure attached to an orderly sexual behavior 
did not detach such act from its virtuous characteristic.61 Similarly, the possibility 
that sexual behavior could distract one from their spiritual matters, St. Aquinas argued, 
did not make the act unvirtuous.62 In other words, "it is not unvirtuous to suspend 
reason for a time for a good reason, other'.Vise sleeping would be a vice."63 For St. 
Aquinas, sexual sin existed when there was a breakdown in the proper reasonable 
order when exercising a sexual act such as when one had sex outside ofmaniage.64 
St. Aquinas further defended the act of sex in maniage by making reference to nah1ral 
law when he established that commitment to a pmiicular woman was defined as 
marriage and such was dictated by natural law.65 Fmihermore, given that natural 
law was enacted for the general good ofsociety and intercourse served the general 
good of society, it followed that the union of the husband and the wife through 
marriage served the good of society and mankind. 66 
55 St. Thomas Aquinas, slipra n. 32, at 561. 
56Jd. 
57 !d. 
58 John Witte, supra n. 38 .. 
59 St. Thomas Aquinas, supra n. 32, at 430. 
60 !d. at 431. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63Jd. 
64Jd. 
65 Id. at 432. 
66Jd. 
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In Summa Theologiae St. Aquinas engages in a distinction between reproduction 
in the state of innocence (the immmial state of a human being) and reproduction in 
the present state (the mortal state of a human being).67 According to St. Aquinas, 
among con·uptible substances the main aim of nature is reproduction and the good 
of the species. 68 Among incorruptible substances the main aim of nature is the 
individual; thus, in the state of innocence, the act of reproduction was needed for 
multiplication of the individual and not for conservation of the specie. 69 Furthem1ore, 
if in the state of innocence the aim of nature was to multiply, in regards to the soul of 
man, St. Aquinas argues that the author of nature needed to be interested in the 
multiplication of individuals for their sake. 7° 
St. Aquinas believed that the argument of earlier theologians, that reproduction 
in the state of innocence took place without intercourse, was unreasonable. 71 In his 
view, reproduction, both before and after sin, took place through intercourse given 
that human beings have been provided with the organs needed for such purpose. n 
What makes intercourse sinful, in the present state, is that such "natural mating of 
male and female is somewhat disfigured by unbalanced desire, but this would not have 
happened in the state of i1mocence where the lower powers obeyed reason."73 This 
unbalance desire leads to the inability of reason to balance the heat and pleasure of 
desire, but when in the state of i1mocence nothing would have escaped reason like that. 74 
As for the pleasure, St. Aquinas felt that the pleasure would not have been to a lesser 
degree but would have been greater "given the greater purity of nature and sensitivity of 
body men then had." 75 To rule by reason does not require that the pleasure be less, but 
that the desire for pleasure be within reasonable bounds. 76 Finally, St. Aquinas addresses 
the topic of sexual abstinence and argues that there would not have been great esteem for 
such in the state of ilmocence given that sexual abstinence, in the present state, is esteem 
because it tempers lust and not because it reduces fruitfulness. 77 
iii. Early Judicial Interventions of the Church 
The first judicial interventions of the Church tended to underline the monogamist 
and indissoluble character of marriage; importance was placed, in the Middle Ages, 
in the initial consent of the formative moment of the matrimonial judicial business, 
67 Id. at 148. 
68 !d. 
69 Id. 
70 !d. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 148. 
76/d. 
77 Id. 
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insisting that this consent is an in-evocable judicial act from which an indissoluble 
bond is born; the beginning of the sacramental nature of the matrimonial contract, of 
those baptized, was approved; the doctrine was not immediately concerned with the 
different ways of manifesting said exchange of consent considering that it followed 
Roman Law which did not ask for certain formalities. 78 
C. Canon Law and Marriage 
i. Essential Elements of Marriage 
It is argued by many of the classical theologians that it is in Genesis 2.24 where 
one can verify that God, the creator of nature, established the natural matrimonial 
institution.79 Thus, it has been said that- Cia che e sicuro e che Gen 2, 24 si refersice 
all 'istituzione matrimonial, non all' attrazione sessuale80- which translates into "That 
which is certain is that Genesis 2, 24 refers to the institution of marriage and not the 
sexual attraction" .. Having identified the origins of the natural institution of marriage, 
one must turn to the task of detennining how God established said natural institution 
of maniage.81 An in order to determine such thing, theologians usually turn to the 
teachings of the Church and Canonist. 82 A closer look at these teachings will reveal 
that God created the natural institution of marriage by way ofthe following essential 
elements: 1) the personal structures- which states that n1an and woman, as a manied 
couple, become intimately complete in the biological and spiritual order, and by 
doing so become one, to that point that anything which is proper to one in each of 
these orders is proper to the other; 2) the essence and the essential properties -
which states that the ut1ion for a lifetime is destined to last as long as. one of the 
spouses does not die; thus, it is considered exclusive and indissoluble; 3) the essential 
purposes; 4) the reciprocal rights and obligations; and 5) the ethical and religious 
principles, which along with the positive legislative norms, specify the agreement in 
its totality and the content ofeachofthe rights/obligations of its members. 83 
ii. Definitions 
In evetyday language, marriage has adopted many different meanings including: 
1) those definitions making reference to the wedding; 2) marriage as a matrimonial 
78 Juan Jose Garcia Failde, Nuevo estudio sabre trastornos psiquicos y nulidad de/matrimonio 86 
(Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 2003). 
79 !d. at 81 (citing P. GaspmTi, Tmctatus Canonicus de matrimonio, vol. I Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 
Romae 1932, 16). 
80 !d. (citing B. Ognibeni, I! matrimonio nell 'm1tico Testamento. Note a uso provato degli studenti, p. 
19). 
81 !d. 
82 !d. 
83 !d. at 82. 
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society and 3) marriage as reference to the living together of the spouses. It is 
important to note that out of all of these definitions, marriage as a status, maniage as 
a matrimonial society or marriage as a partnership that is to last for a lifetime should 
be considered as providing a "true" definition of marriage. 84 The legal canonical 
definition of marriage can be obtain through a slight style modification of Canon 
1055 and formulated as follows: "A partnership of the whole life established between 
a male and a female, through the matrimonial partnership (alliance), order, by its 
own nature, for the good of the spouses and for the procreation and education of the 
offspring." 85 
iii. Purposes 
The use of the word purpose is understood as that end for which an action is 
ordered or for which an action is carried out. 86 When talking about marriage, two 
types of purposes have been identified. 87 First, there is the .essential, objective, 
natural purpose: that for which an action is ordered or carried out.88 Second, there is 
the accidental, subjectiveextrinsic purpose: that end or goal for which.the person 
carries out the action. 89 During the middle ages, there was only one essential purpose 
considered - the education and procreation of children.90 Beginning in the 11th 
Century, we see a move towards identifying three purposes for marriage - the 
procreation and education of children, mutual help and the remedy for the hunger 
and desire of earthly goods and uncontrollable pleasures.91 It is important to note 
that, during this time; the previously identified purposes were not categorized or 
given any priority.92 Nevertheless, with the writing of the Canon Code of 1917, we 
see the three purposes categorized with procreation and education· of the children as 
the primary purpose and mutual help and the remedy for the hunger and desire of 
earthly goods and uncontrollable pleasures as the secondmy purpose ofmarriage.93 
According to the Traditional Canon Law doctrine, the 2 secondaty purposes are 
essentially subordinated to the primary purpose. 94 In other words, the secondary 
purposes are considered purposes because of their subordination to the primary 
purpose. 95 Consider that mutual help is not an intrinsic purpose of marriage given 
84 /d.at81. 
85 Alberto Bernandez Canton, Compendio de Derecho Matrimonial Canonico 23 (Tecnos 1991 ). 
86 Carlos Warnholtz, supm n. 8 at 28. 
87 !d. 
88 !d. 
89 !d. at 29. 
90 !d. 
91Jd. 
92 !d. 
93 !d. 
94 !d. 
95 !d. 
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that such help can exist in any relationship outside of marriage.96 As for the remedy 
for the hunger and desire of earthly goods and uncontrollable pleasures, it is obtained 
through the action of marriage; thus, it is not a substantial part of marriage. 97 
iv. Goods 
It is interesting to consider how the three goods of marriage (bonum sacramenti, 
bonum fidei and bonum prolis) identified by St. Augustine not only became an 
important part of the Jurisprudence of the church but also became a vehicle through 
which the substantial elements of marriage were shown.98 The bonum sacramenti 
represents the inability to dissolve the marriage enrto such an extent that, theologians 
have argued, without this good there cannot exist a true marriage.99 This is so because 
bonum sacramenti is part of maniage itself and not a good that is derived from the 
use of marriage given that the inability to dissolve a marriage represents the 
unbreakable union between Christ and the Church. 100 The bonum fidei represents 
the right to fidelity and the obligation to maintain said fidelity in accordance with 
the bond of unity for a lifetime. 101 It is, as theologians have argued, the exclusive 
right to share in the manied life and to raise children not the exclusive right to 
fidelity itself.1o2 Finally bonum prolis represents the right to procreation arid to educate 
the progeny along with the right to paternity and matemity. 103 It is impmiant to note 
that progeny is not an essential pati of marriage given that in the contrary any marriage 
without children would be considered null. A sector of theologians have argued the 
existence of a fourth good of maniage which has been identified as bonum coniugum 
and represents a complement to the previously discussed essential purposes of 
marriage and with which a true partnership of a lifetime could not be understood. 104 
This fourth good also represents a right and an obligation to the good of the union. 105 
A good of the union that requires all of the necessary elements for a healthy 
interpersonal relationships including good will, companionship, friendship and the 
duty and right to married love. 106 
v. Properties 
The essential properties of marriage, identified in Canon 1056, are unity and 
the indissoluble character of matTiage which have reached a patiicular level of strength 
96Jd. 
97 Id. 
98 Carlos Warnholtz, supra n. 8, at 31. 
99 !d. 
100 !d. 
101 !d. 
I02Jd. 
103 !d. 
104 !d. at 32. 
105 !d. 
106Jd. 
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and stability by way of the sacrament. 107 It is important to establish that the tenn 
essential property talks about a scholastic metaphysical concept, which is not similar 
to the legal concept ofproperty. 108 In the Scholastic Philosophy an essential property, 
of a being or entity, is understood as that, which even when not a part of its essence, 
it characterizes or identifies the being or entity in such a manner that without said 
property it would not be .able to exist. 109 Thus, in a similar manner unity and the 
indissoluble character of maniage characterize and identify maniage to such an 
extent that without these two essential properties a maniage could not be considered 
a marriage. 110 Unity is the strength of the married union and of the mutual sunender 
between men and women. 111 It is what makes the union between a man and a woman 
exclusive. The indissolubility of marriage is what makes the union ofmaniage and 
the mutual surrender perpetual until the death of one of the spouses. It is important 
to distinguish between an intimate (essential) unbreakable character and an external 
(non essential) unbreakable character of marriage. The first deals with the 
impossibility of dissolving the union using the same purpose for which it was form 
in the first place, in other words, by way of the private will and initiative of the 
parties. 112 The second type deals with the impossibility of dissolving the union by 
way of a public authority (ecclesiastical or civil). 113 Unity and the indissoluble 
character of marriage come from the same natural condition of marriage, in other 
words, they are essential to it. 114 The agreement to be together for a lifetime implies 
a personal and complete surrender and acceptance, by each of the spouses, to the 
.other. 115 And if it is considered personal and complete it must be Exclusive and 
Perpetual. Hence, unity and the indissoluble character of marriage make up, each in 
its own right but mutually complementing each other as well, the monogamous 
marriage; thereby, excluding any type of polygamy. 116 
vi. Marriage as Sacrament 
The Sacraments are ordered for the sanctity of men, for the edification of the 
Body ofCluist and for the praise of God; but they also have a pedagogical end. 117 The 
sacraments not only entail faith they also feed, strengthen and expre~ifaith by way of 
words and things. 118 This is why the sacraments are called sacraments of the faith. 
107 !d. at 34 
I08Jd. 
to9 Id. 
110 !d. 
IIIJd. 
112 1d. at 35 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116Jd. 
117 ld. at 42 
118Jd. 
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A group oftheologians have discussed the Christian marriage, as well as the 
other sacraments, as a sacramental sign and real symbol that confers grace by way 
of the act performed by Christ and not just through the faith of those that receive it. 
119 In order to further understand such argument it is important to define the words 
sign and grace. A sign is that which, when seen or known, leads us to the knowledge 
of that which is unknown or that which we caru10t see. 120 A sign can be natural or 
conventional; it can be a thing, an action, words or even all three things. 121 One 
example of a natural sign is smoke considering that if an individual were to see 
smoke he/she would most likely deduce that there was a fire. 122 An example of a 
. . f . . 123 
conventional sign is the flag of a country wh1ch serves as a stgn o patnotlsm. 
Hence, sacraments, unlike other signs, are effective of the grace, in other words, not 
only do they lead to knowledge or remind us of the grace, but they themselves give 
or grant that which they stand for, of course if the person that receives them is one 
with faith. 124 Grace is the sanctification or justification of men by way of the divine 
life that God instills in our souls. 125 But it is also the way by which God gives man 
the assistance necessary so that he can can)' out with his duties. 126 Nevertheless, it is 
important to understand that each sacrament grants the sacramental grace unique to 
its characteristics; thus, the grace of matrimony is different than the grace of 
priesthood but they both are divine assistance. 127 
Having provided a concise definition of the elements that make up a sacrament, 
we now turn our attention to the sacrament of marriage and the struggle oftheologians 
and canonist to identify the different components of this sacrament. Two theories 
evolved to address this matter- one developed by the earlier theologians and canonist 
. d . 128 p· 1 1' another developed by the modern. theologians an canomsts. 1rst, t 1e ear ter 
theologians and canonist, who, in looking at the effective cause of marriage as the 
mutua~ consent of 2 parties expressed by way of words, tried to incorporate to the 
marriage contract, the categories of matter and form. 129 The concepts of matter and 
form were borrowed, by said individuals, from the teachings of the Scholastic 
metaphysics which holds that every body or material entity is made up of matter and 
form. 130 Matter was seen as the common and indetem1inate element that was 
determined by the form. 131 Thus, the most common opinion of the earlier theologians 
119 Lawrence G. Wren, The Invalid Marriage 222 (Canon Law Society of America 1998). 
12° Carlos Warnholtz, supl·a n. 8, at 42. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 !d. at 43 
12s Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 43. 
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was that the sacrament was realized in the valid contract, but even more the contract 
was seen as the sacrament, 132 The consent of husband and wife, which was seen as 
the essence of the contract and the effective cause of the sacrament, was at the same 
time the matter and form of the sacrament.133 The matter, as the indetenninate element, 
were the words or signs in so much as they expressed the mutual surrender ofhusband 
and wife. 134 The form, a determinate element, were the same words or signs in so 
much as they expressed the mutual acceptance of both male and female as husband 
and wife. 135 Been the sacrament the same valid contract, and whose essence was 
consent, the minister of the sacrament was not the priest or deacon but rather those 
that were getting married. 136 Thus, it was the husband and wife that were getting 
married before the priest or deacon who, in turn, acted as a witness by assisting in 
the matrimony. 137 Concluding, the earlier opinion viewed husband and wife as making 
the contract who then made the sacrament. 138 
Modern theologians and canonist do not place much emphasis on the argument 
of matter and form. Rather, they reflect more on the mysterious meaning of the union 
that husband and wife have in relation to the Christ-Church union. 139 A union that is 
certainly initiated in the contract, but that lasts or should last as long as the bond 
between husband and wife exists, in other words, until the death of one of them. 140 
. In his work Summa Theologiae, St. Aquinas addresses the important distinction 
of those sacraments that existed during the 0 ld Law and those that exists in theN ew 
Law. 1·41 The author begins his argument stating that, in the state of innocence, 
sacraments were not needed either to achieve knowledge and grace or as remedies 
for sin. 142 As for marriage, although it existed during the state of itmocence it did not 
do so as a s~crament but rather to serve its natural function. 143 And here is where the 
author establishes the primary difference of sacraments, primarily marriage, in the 
Old Law and the New Law. For St. Aquinas, marriage "symbolized the future 
relationship of Christ and his church, just as everything else that preceded Christ 
prefigured him." 144 Thus, the Old Law sacraments foretold the Christ to come given 
that only through Christ, and after Adam's sin, could men be made holy again. 145 St. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135Jd. 
136 ld. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 46. 
140 Id. 
141 St. Thomas Aquinas, supra n. 32, at 550 .. 
142 1d. at 459. 
143 Id. 
144Jd. 
l45Jd. 
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Aquinas follows by stating that "before Christ's coming there needed to be certain 
visible signs that a man could use to attest his faith in the future coming of the 
saviour. 146 The New Law sacraments were symbolic ofthatwhich already took place 
in Christ while the Old Law sacraments prefigured it as future. 147 Borrowing from 
the teachings of St. Paul, the author states that Old Law sacraments were weak and 
needy elements given that they did not contain or cause grace. 148 On the other hand, 
St. Aquinas states that the New Law sacraments "contain and cause grace, and don't 
merit the same judgment."149 
The distinction between the Old Law sacraments and the New Law sacraments 
was not only relevant to the elements of a sacrament (symbol and grace) given that 
it led to two distinct views of marriage which were contemporaneous with their time 
and line ofthought. 150 In the early centuries of the Church, marriage was considered 
as something sacred and religious even when the technical concept of sacrament did 
not exist. 151 The liturgical celebration of marriage slowly developed throughout the 
East and West. 152 The Holy Fathers, making reference to the text of St. Paul's Letter 
to the Ephesians exhort to the Christian husband and wife to love themselves as 
Christ loved his Church. 153 In this view, the Christ-Church relationship is not only 
an example or a model to be followed but rather a true communication, a participation 
of the Christ-Church union to the inferior reality of the union ofhusband and wife. 154 
In his text, St. Paul exhorts the Christian husband and wife to the unbreakable union, 
to the _loyalty and love basing this on 2 main arguments. 155 The first argument is 
based on the comparison doctrice of the Mystic Body of Christ, set forth in his first 
letter to the Corinthians, primarily I Corinthians 12; 12-28. 15~ His second argument 
is based on Genesis 2, 23-24 where St. Paul finds in the union of Adam and Eve 
prior to sin, a union similar to that of Christ and the Church. 157 Prior to sin, and 
when God introduce the woman to Adam, he responded "At last, here is one of my 
own kind- Bone taken from my bone, and flesh from my flesh. 'Woman' is her 
name because she was taken out ofman."158 Thus, it could be infer that Adam saw in 
the woman someone with whom he could dialogue, someone he could love and that 
could love him back, some one with whom he could be together. 159 After sin, the 
146 !d. 
147 !d. at 550 
148 !d. 
149 !d. 
15° Carlos Wamholtz, supra n. 8, at 46. 
151 Id. 
152 !d. 
153 !d. 
154 !d. 
155 !d. 
156 !d. at 47. 
157 !d. 
158 Holy Bible 3, (American Bible Institute 1992). 
159 Carlos Wamholtz, supra n. 8, at 4 7. 
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relationship of man and woman was damage giving rise to the jealousy in both; the 
love of the woman turned into seduction, selfishness, manipulation; the love of man 
turned into control. 160 Thus, man and women, as well as marriage, were in need of 
redemption. 161 
Christ, by way of his death and resurrection, established the "new alliance" 
with the baptized people (the Church). 162 By way of this alliance, God established 
that union that existed between Adam and Eve prior to sin, which was a simple 
archeotype of his union with the Church- mutual surrender and the unbreakable 
and eternal common union of love. 163 Christian husband and wife, who by way of 
baptismare members of the body of Christ, participate with Christ in the mission of 
sanctification, salvation and of the growth of the mystic Body by participating in the 
bearing and education of the new children of God. 164 It is important to establish that 
the significance of the new alliance is not purely symbolic, but rather one that must 
be effective. 165 Both Christian husband and wife must reflect and make effective in 
their conjugal union, the union of Christ and the Church, all that such union implicates: 
love, surrender, loyalty, comtnunion and the unbreakable character of the union. 166 
In order to accomplish such task, the married couple relies on the grace of Christ, 
which not only sanctifies, but also helps them in accomplishing their calling as a 
couple and as parents. 167 The only difference between the conjugal union and the 
union of Christ with the Church, is that in the conjugal union, husband and wife are 
in a plan of comparison and at the same time of reciprocity: both of them are. members 
of the Body of Christ, andChrist is the Head ofboth; the husband needs the love and 
care of his wife just as much as her. 168 
III. Contractual and Non Contractual Theories 
The first asserts that consent in marriage is a contract while the second theory 
denies it. 
Both positions admit the distinction that exists between abstract marriage 
(matrimonial institution) and specific marriage. 
Both are in agreement that without the consent of the contracting parties there 
is no specific marriage between the two of them. 
Both theories coincide that for every specific matTiage to be considered a tme 
maiTiage, it must contain each and evety one of the essential constituent elements of 
160 Id. at 48. 
161 !d. 
162 !d. 
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the abstract marriage. In other words, both maintain that the abstract marriage (the 
matrimonial institution) has essential properties, a nature, intrinsic purposes pre-
established by the Creator of marriage and, as consequence, must appear in every 
specific marriage, given that in every specific marriage the abstract matrimony must 
exist (the matrimonial institution), in such a manner that any specific marriage that 
is missing any of the previously mentioned elements will not be considered a true 
marriage. 
From the previous, both theories conclude that the ability to detennine, to limit 
or change the previously mentioned elements are not left to the contracting parties' 
free disposition. The only freedom that the contracting parties have is to desire or 
not desire to be married, to desire to marry with a specific person. 
The contractualists add that for every instance, it is solely the consent of both 
parts that gives to the concrete marriage between them, while the non contractualists 
(the institutionalists) reply that that at least in some cases along with that consent, 
the ecclesiastical authority operates as a factor of the birth of the concrete marriage 
among the contracting parties. 
Besides, the contractualist insist in that the consent (and only the consent) of 
the parties that creates among them the specific marriage, is a contract, regardless of 
how much it is "sui generis" contract; rather the non contractualist (institutionalists) 
deny that such consent participates in the nature of the contracts. 
Both theories admit, that as a consequence of the contracting parties having 
consented to be one for the other, a series of rights and obligations arise among 
them; but according to the contractualists these set of rights and obligations become 
the responsibility of the contracting parties exclusively because of the stipulated 
contract between the two of them as a result of having consented to marriage and the 
institutionalists will say that such rights and obligations are not established because 
of an stipulated contract between them once they consented to marriage, but rather 
these rights and obligations arise at the moment that they consent to be together and 
such obligations are imposed on them by the fundamental law of the .matrimonial 
institution to which they have desired to have applied to them. '· 
As a consequetice, according to the contractualists, those rights and obligations, 
given that they have their origin in a private contract between the two of them, they 
are a purely conunutative justice, as for the institutionalists, such rights and obligations 
can arise either from legal justice or social justice given that they come from the 
fundamental law of the matrimonial institution. 
It would be proper to state as follows: 
According to the contractualist theory of matrimonial consent, it is only the 
consent between both parties that should be attributed to establishing both parties as 
husband and wife. The consent and only the consent, between both parties, creates 
the matrimonial bond and it is the subjective, efficient, sole and un-substitutable 
cause of each specific maniage; only to this cause do we owe the fact that the abstract 
maniage is established among the parties; only this cause creates among the parties 
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the specific marriage which is the judicial bond and mutual judicial obligation, according 
to the previous understanding, of the previous Canon Law Code, in other words the 
Codex of 1917, to those acts order for the procreation because of their nature; and if 
each of the parties has a right to the body of the other, it is only because they have 
granted such right by way of their consent to one another, granting such right and 
imposing such obligation by way of a mutual consent, which is a bilateral.contract 
stipulated by both. From the previous, stems that the rights-obligations between husband 
and wife, in as much as they proceed from the stipulated contract between them at 
marriage, are rights and obligations of pure commutative justice. 
The contractualist continue to indicate that considering that the effect of contracts 
is the obligation (given that every ultimate purpose of a contract consists of regulating, 
in other words, produce, modify, terminate obligations and judicial bonds) among the 
contracting parties, or at least in one of them as is the case of a donation contract; thus, 
they conclude that the consent-cause of contracts is the authentic contract: for them; 
the formation of marriage consent-cause is the same as the consent-bilateral contract. 
The non-contractualist theory (institutionalist) on the other hand denies that 
consent can be reduced to a private contract, along with denying that the consent of 
the contracting parties be the cause, or that it be the cause in all cases, of each 
specific marriage. For the non-contractualists, the specific marriage consists of a 
mutual bond of juridical nature; but this bond is not reduce as has been already said, 
to a mere contractual relation, which necessarily arises out of a contract, but rather a 
juridical complex reality refetTed to as "pminership of the whole life", as Canon 
1055, Section 1169 says, or in a more technical manner "institution and juridical 
system", with a content detennined by its own aim, which are rights and obligations 
that are always common and in part reciprocal, with some inherent to the association 
and others derived from it. 
They also add that there are instances (such as the sanation in light of the 
marriage, that of the condition once it is fulfilled, etc.) in which the will of the 
Church is the sole cause (for which the consent of the patiies is pre~upposed) or the 
factor (along with another cause which is the consent of the contracting parties) 
which bonds husband and wife in a specific marriage, the one that causes the birth 
of the specific bond between husband and wife; thus, in these cases the juridical 
effects (among them the bond) are not due or are not solely due to the consent of 
both parties and, as consequence, the consent of the contracting parties is not a 
contract and its limited to its adherence to the matrimonial institution in abstract 
that, as a result of the free adhesion, it is made present with all of its nature, propetiies, 
aims, right and obligations of husband and wife. 
The public authority is who creates, among the contracting parties, the specific 
bond, at least in some cases (and this is sufficient to not say that the consent is 
always the cause or contract of the concrete maniage). The public authority does so 
169 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1. 
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by applying the matrimonial institution or the abstract marriage. It is true that the 
public authority does not create the bond between them, the one in which the abstract 
marriage focuses on, if the parties did not want to be husband and wife; but this want 
is presupposed or operates as a condition sin qua non to allow both parties to establish 
such bond and not as a cause that leads to such bond, which produces in the contracting 
parties the specific bond. 
And as a result of being husband and wife, one for the other, there arises, between 
them, a series of rights and mutual juridical obligations of a juridical nature that, 
because they do not arise from their consent as cause and; thus, as contract, do not 
belong to the confines of the commutative justice but because they arise from the 
fundamental law of the matrimonial institution, belong to the legal justice. 
What can we conclude from all of the previous? The following: 
. A~ in depth study of the two theories in question establishes an extremely 
mterestmg field for the canon doctrine; nevertheless, it is outside the realm and 
objective of this essay, what is clear is that a context such as the current one in 
which the understanding of specific marriage as a judicial bond or right has b~en 
overcome, one in which a correlative obligation would be involved (consequence of 
the contracts themselves) to those acts fit for procreation; thus, leading marriage to 
be conceive as an association of a lifetime order as such by its own nature not only 
to the procreation but also for the "good of the spouses" (Canon 1055, &1)170 as a 
"mutual surrender and acceptance of the spouses" (Canon 1057, &2) 171 , in ~ther 
words as something that hugely transcends the mutual surrender-acceptance of a 
right-obligation to those acts fit for procreation; in such a context, it much more 
diffi~ult to accept that it is solely a consequence of a contract between both contracting 
parties, and as such, that everything be reduced to one simple contractual relation 
between husband and wife. 
There are other questions that have a response, but due to their magnitude it is 
not possible to include them, for example: 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
1. In relation to the mutual surrender to a right of the use of the it bodies, even 
when reduced to those acts fit for procreation, one must take' into account 
that, the contracting parties, prior to consent to their union in marriage, neither 
of them have ownership or control over their respective bodies or over their 
use in regards to those acts previously mentioned for procreation. This is 
something that is difficult for some distinguished canonist to conceive. 
2. In the examples that are mentioned by the non-contractualist (sanation in root 
. ' 
s1mple recognition) to demonstrate that it is not the consent of the contracting 
parties, but rather the public authority the one that creates the specific marriage 
between them, expert canonists 172 very easily respond that even in those 
instances it is that consent which produces the concrete marriage. 
172 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 16-19. 
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IV. The Basic Principle of Consent 
The consent of the contracting parties is the fundamental element of marriage 
as can be seen from Canon 1057 § 1, which, faithful to a very old tradition, tells us 
that the consent of the contracting parties is what achieves marriage, and proclaims 
this principle as such: "The consent of the parties, legitimately manifested between 
persons qualified by law, makes marriage; no human power is able to supply this 
consent." 173 
This basic principle, established in Canon 1057 § 1, is expressed in the 
following two assertions: 
a) it is necessary; 
b) it is sufficient for the concrete marriage to exist 
All substantive and adjective or procedural matrimonial canon law revolves 
around matrimonial consent; the substantive element describes its nature, properties 
and the essential purposes, the factors that prevent its birth or its juridical efficacy, 
among other aspects, and the procedural element shows the method through which 
one can, with cetiainty, in a process discover if in a concrete case there was consent 
or if it was judicially ineffective. 
V. Nature of Consent 
Matrimonial consent is composed of two acts of will, one act corresponding to 
each contracting party. If this act of will is missing or is judicially ineffective in at 
least one of the contracting parties, it is sufficient so that consent does not exist or 
' 
respectively that it be not judicially effective. 
Now then, it is convenient to clarify that from a theoretical perspective, it is 
not the same thing to say that there is exists no consent and that consent is judicially 
ineffective. The non-existing consent is evidently judicially ineffective, in other 
words, it does not produce the judicial effect that is the matrimon:ial bond. On the 
other hand, the judicially ineffective consent assumes the existence of consent. The 
result of one is the result of the other: the null effect on the judicial order; in both 
instances there is no judicially valid marriage. And with a view to a challenge of 
maniage by way of an action of nullity, the canonist legislation will put in the same 
level the non-existent consent and the judicially ineffective consent. !74 
The consent of both parties is what "makes or produces" marriage and in this 
phase, it can be understood in two senses, both valid, in the sense that it is efficient 
cause and in the sense that it is a fonnal cause of marriage. 
173 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1. 
174 Juan Jose Garcia Fail de, Apuntes del XXXII curs a de actualizaci6n can6nica Tomo I, 6 (Asociaci6n 
Mexicana de Canonistas, 7-11 julio 2008). 
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When referring to the efficient sense we are talking about when the matrimonial 
bond of both parties is originated by those acts of will. And in the sense of being a 
fonnal cause of marriage, we are referring to how those acts of will, in other words 
of consent, enter as an essential element, becomes a part of the essence of marriage, 
given that consent, by way of its union with the matter, which are the contracting 
parties, detennines them or places them in the category of spouses, as well as 
determining or placing consent in the "matrimonial" category. And having this in 
mind, it is understood that the canonist legislator, after determining that marriage is 
fulfilled by the consent of the will, adds that said consent cannot be supplement by 
no human power. 
In order to better understand the previous, it is convenient to explain the 
distinction between the matrimonial bond and the matrimonial consent. Canonist 
tradition has always distinguished between the matrimonial bond and the matrimonial 
consent, the first is the marriage already perfonned, already established ("matrimonio 
in facto esse") and the second is marriage in its phase of fulfillment ("matrimonio 
in fieri"). Some authors point out that this distinction belongs to the ancient canonists, 
prior to the Second Vatican Council ( 1962-1965), 175 but in our current times the 
concept of marriage has evolved towards a more human and comprehensive 
dimension, which can be seen by reading some of the texts of the Gaudium et Spes 
Constitution about the church in the modern world, and even though it is not a 
proper judicial text, it is the source of the new concept of marriage, same which is 
expressed in the actual Code. 176 
175 Carlos Warnholtz, supra n. 8, at 26. 
176Jd. 
The profound transformations of contemporary society, regardless of the difficulties to which 
they have given way to (free love, poligamy, divorce, hedonism, sexual abuse in order for 
mutu.al use, economic situation, socio-psychological and civil, etc.) very frequently manifest 
in different ways the true natme, energy, and strenght of the institution of marriage and family. The 
welt being of the person and of human and Christian society is very closely linked to the 
favorable and prosperious condition of the spousal and familial community. (citilig Note 47). 
Marriage is no longer solely conceived as a <contract> which gives <rights> to the body for 
the generative acts. Marriage "is the alliance (or covenant) of the spouses ... thus, husband and 
wife surrender themselves and give themselves to each other", from where we see the birth of 
"the intimate spousal community of life and love ... This intimate union, as a mutual sunender 
of two individuals, as well as the good of the offspring, demands full spousal fidelity and its 
indissoluble unity. (citing Note 48). 
The foundation of this intimate union is spousal love: "This love, given that it is essentially 
human, because it goes from person to person with an affection or feeling born from the will, 
encompasses the good of people; thus, it is able to enrich, with a special dignity, the expressions 
of the body and the spirity, and of making them noble as elements and specific signals of 
spousal friendship ... Such love, associating with it the human and the divine, takes husband 
and ':"ife to the free and mutual gift of each other, proven by feelings and acts of tendemess, 
and 1t pervades for their entire life, .... thus, it surpasses the purely erotic tendencies which, 
selfishly cultivated, quickly and regrettably fade away. (citing Note 49). 
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The spousal love is "essentially human" because it goes from "person to person 
with an affection or a feeling that is born from the understanding and the will", which 
leads the spouses to a free and mutual gift of each other and it pervades all of their 
lives. 177 Because of this spousal love they give and accept each other mutually as 
people and in it "shall be recognized the equal personal dignity of woman and man". 
And from this personal surrender of the spouses is the "intimate spousal community 
of live and love" born, (totius vitae consuetude et communion) which is marriage. 178 
This allows us to reflect on what was said about love by St. Ignatius Loyola in 
his Spiritual Exercises. At the commencement of the four week period of the exercises, 
St. Ignatius Loyola provides a large preparation for them and at the conclusion of 
such, he provides us, as a crowning moment, an extremely important conclusion in 
order to guarantee the proposed results. And he titles it "Contemplation for reaching 
love" which is made up of two notes: 
First Note 
Of the words of love 
Text. First, it is worth to warn in two cases. 
The first is that love should be put more in the acts than in the words. 
Second Note 
Of the works of love. 
Text. The second, love consists of communications among the two 
parties, it is about the party that is giving love to give and to communicate 
to the party receiving love what he has or what he can, and similarly the 
same must be done by the party receiving love to the party giving love; 
thus, if one has science, to provide such science to the one that does not 
have it, the same ifl1e has honors, the same if he has riches. 179 
This love is expressed and is individually perfected through the act of maniage itself. .. (which 
carried out) tmly in a human manner, expresses and favors the reciprical gift;Jhrough which 
they are mutually enriched in an atmosphere of joyful gratitude ... The unity of marriage, 
confirmed by our Lord, clearly appears in the equal personal dignity and of the woman, which 
needs to be recognized in their mutual and complete love. 
Marriage and spousal love are order, through their own nature, to the procreation and education 
of the offspring. Children, are without a doubt, the most excellent gift of marriage and they 
contribute to the good of the parents ... But marriage has not only been created for procreation. 
Rather, the nature of the indissoluble covenant between the individuals and the good of the 
offspring demand that the mutual Jove of the spouses manifest itself according to the honest 
order (have its honest manifestations), it is developed and it arrives at maturity. Thus, even if 
the offspring, in many occassions so fully desired, is missing, marriage survives as total intimacy 
and community for life ( "ut totious vitae consuetudo et communio ")and it maintains its value 
and indissolubility. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Ignacio Casanovas, supra n. 3, at 199. 
,- ----~-----------------
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All of this content and dimension of marriage, go beyond the judicial categories 
and it can hardly be expressed in its concepts. For this reason, the Codifying 
Commission when drafting Canon 1055 and after many discussions, preferred to 
state "in recto" that marriage among the baptized is a sacrament, but describing "in 
obliquo" what natural marriage is, in the actual terms of Canons 1055 and 1057.180 
. In these two canons, the principal elements of the definition of marriage are 
found: 
a) Marriage "in fieri" is the irrevocable alliance or covenant (foedus), originating 
in the legitimately manifested consent by both contracting parties qualified 
by law, which consists of the mutual surrender and acceptance as a person, 
in their capacity of spouses, and for which they create a partnership for a 
lifetime.It is convenient to mention that even though canon 1055 uses 
interchangeably the terms "partnership" and "covenant", the term 
"pminership" is preferred, given that it is not only judicial but also biblical, 
given that it is richer than the term "covenant" because it expresses better 
the "personal" element, in other words the mutual surrender and acceptance, 
and it invokes the peculiar relationship between God and his chosen people. 181 
b) Marriage "in facto esse" is that same partnership for a lifetime already created 
by the spouses' alliance. 
Thus, the expression "partnership for a lifetime" was preferred instead of"intimate 
spousal conmmnity of life and love" used in the Constitution "Gaudium et Spes" and 
from the terni "communio" (which appears ambiguous) and"conjunctio" (impoverished) 
because the partnership better expr'esses the intimate co-existence of marriage and has 
greater judicial tradition, given that it appears in Modestino 's definition.182 
The Jurisprudence from the Roman Rota Tribunal without a doubt had an 
influence in these changes, which beginning in 1969 evolved towards the personal 
tendencies of marriage and considered the right to a life of community and love as 
object of matrimonial consent. 
In order to understand the "make up of matrimonial consent" ifis necessary to 
analyze the following points: 
18
° Canon 1055, Section 1. "The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish 
between themselves a partnership of the whole life and which is ordered by its nature to the good of 
the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring, has been raised by Christ the Lord to the 
dignity of a sacrament between the baptized. 
Section 2. "For this reason, a valid matrimonial contract cannot exist between the baptized withouth 
it being by that fact a sacrament". 
Canon 1057, Section 1. "The consent of the parties, legitimately manifested between persons qualified 
by law, makes maniage; no human power is able to supply this consent". 
Section 2. "Matrimonial consent is an act of the will by which a man and a woman mutually give and 
accept each other through an irrevocable covenant in order to establish maniage". 
181 Warnholtz Bustillos, supra n. 8, at 27. 
182 Id. at 28. 
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a) There is a the habit ofvivisectioning human beings into zones or sections, to 
which different names are given, such as understanding, will and emotion. 
And in each one of these zones we place different acts, for example, in 
understanding our thoughts, in will those of free choice, and in the emotion 
our feelings and emotions . 
The previous does not corr~spond to reality, eventhough it helps us to understand 
ourselves better. It does not respond to reality because the person is indivisible, in 
other words, it does not have understanding with which to think with, nor will with 
which to make free choices, nor emotions with which to feel with, etc .. 
It is the "entire" person that thinks, the entire person that chooses, the entire 
person that feels and when we say "entire" it is understood that we are talking about 
an individual with "everything", everything that makes him who he is with his genes, 
with his biology, with his physiology, with his brain, with his feelings, with his 
physic, with his gods and his demons, with his accomplishments and his mysteries; 
although, as it will be seen, not all of an individual's components will have the same 
level of participation in these acts. 
What must be very clear here is that the "I" that thinks, that chooses and that 
loves is the same "I" that feels, that sees, that listens, that walks, that nourishes 
himself/herself, etc. 183 · 
Because it is an "I" that at the same time is a soma and a spirit, it is not correct 
to say that man has a spirit and a soma, but rather that man is spirit and soma; man, 
in its entirety, is a somatized spirit and spiritualized soma. 
Referring to that soma as body and to that spirit as "soul", the following can be 
asserted: 
• That the human body needs the human soul to be a human body; that is why 
when the human soul separates itself from the body at deMh, the body seizes 
to be a human body and becomes a c~daver. . 
• That the human body needs the human soul to "act": no vegetative or sensible 
activity of that human body would be possible without that hwnan soul. An 
intense intellectual activity can suspend the carrying out of any of those 
vegetative or sensible activities, and an intense alteration of the functioning 
of the will could accelerate or slow down the rhythm of a vegetative or 
sensible life. 
• That the human soul does not need the human body to be or to exist given 
that it is spiritual. For this reason, the human soul does not die when the 
human body, to which it was attached to, dies. 
• That the human sould needs, in this life, of the human body, and more 
specifically of its senses and of its brain for its operations of thinking, wanting, 
183 Garcia Failde, supra n. 174, at 5. 
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etc. Before a though or a volition different parts of the brain are activated. 
184 This explains the following: 
o That all spiritual act, regardless ofhow sublime it is considered has some 
. ' 
matenal component and that all material act, regardless of how modest it 
is considered, has some spiritual component. It is here that the difference 
between a human being and an animal lies: for example a man and an 
animal can pull a wheel cart and unfold the exact same effort and make 
the exact same movement, but the work that both of them perform does 
not have the same value given that the work that the animal does is physical-
immaterial and the one that man performs is physical-spiritual. 
o That the term "mental disease" (or of the soul or of the mind) can be 
accepted if with such term someone is looking to point out that what is 
truly sick is the material (senses, brain, etc.) and as a consequence of such 
the mind, the soul cannot operate; thus, in some sense the mind, the soul 
are sick; but the mind and the soul cannot be sick because they are 
spiritua1. 185 · 
b) Let us now look at the "exclusive psychological phenomenon of man" under 
the following considerations: · · 
There are psychological phenomenon that mark the qualitative difference 
between a human being and an animal, which tells us that the human being is a 
"separate" being, is "another" distinct being from the animal, and who depend, as a 
result o~a cause, of the vital (soul).spiritual principle of man, even when the brain is 
a requisite for the vital principle causing such psychol~gical phenomenon. Sure 
~nough, man "thinks", "speaks", "wants fre~ly", "makes history", "loves" and, what 
IS more extraordinary, '~is conscious" that he is thinking, that he wants freely that he 
loves, and in general of all of his being and of all his doing. ' 
184 Jd. 
• Man "thinks": "thinking" is a triple act: perception, judgment and reasoning. 
• Man "talks": in other wo~·ds, expresses his tl;oughts in v.:;~rds; thereby, 
con:mmnicating with other human beings. · 
• Man "wants freely" in the sense that his will its not necessarily fixed to one 
particular thing, but rather it is open to many possibilities. And by been free, 
man can "make history". 
Paleontology has verified that the human intelligence appears whe~ encephalization has acquired 
a high degree in regards to the volume and the organization of the cerebral mass; and it is 
sufficient, for example, that the brain not be fully develop, as is the case of a newly born, or that 
it be severely injured, as is the case with intoxication or an automoo'ile accident, so that the 
understanding cannot think. The same happens with the volitive activity that in order to act 
needs a strong sensible emotional support which always accompanies an emotional spiritual 
state. 
185 Id. at 6. 
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• Man "loves", he has the capability of giving his relationships significance 
and a loving human value. 
• But above all, man has a characteristic that has no correspondence to animals: 
"conscience". Man is capable of "entering" within himself and figuring out 
who he is and what he does, he is capable of saying "I": "I" am, "I" think, 
"I" love, "I" must die. To say "I" is the most extraordinary event in the 
umverse. 
But man can cany these actions out precisely because he has a vital principle 
(soul) that causes them, even if they are caused through the use of the brain as an 
instrument and that is "spiritual": if those acts are spiritual, the cause that produces 
them must be spiritual. 
Let us remember Teilhard de Chardin: "Man knows that he knows. He emerges 
from his actions. He dominates them in however feeble a way. He can therefore 
abstract, combine and foresee. He reflects. He thinks. From our empirical point of 
view, reflection is, as the world indicates, the power acquired by a consciousness to 
tum in upon itself, to take possession of itself as of an object endowed with its own 
particular consistence and value: no longer merely to know oneself; no longer merely 
to know, but to know that one knows". 186 
We resume by saying that man thinks, talks, wants freely, makes history, loves, 
is conscious of all of this "not" through his brain but rather through his spiritual vital 
principle (soul). Given that the brain is not the "cause" or the "non-cause" of the 
acts of thinking, of wanting freely, etc. The brain of a human being does not think, 
the brain of a human being does not want freely, etc. but rather it is man who thinks 
with his intelligence, man who wants freely tlu·ough his will, etc. which are faculties 
of the spiritual vital principle- soul- whicl1 man has. 187 · 
c) Now then, man has a spiritual vital principle (soul) which fonns with the material 
principle (body) a unit: 
"Spiritual" is not the same as "ethereal". "Ethereal" simply means a form 
"superior" to the matter. Matter, because it is a quantity, is divisible, but ethereal 
means simple without parts, although it is linked to the matter and dependant on the 
matter for its existence and perishes when the matter perishes. 
On the other hand, "spirituality" is far superior to matter not only because it is 
"ethereal" but, even more so, because it is autonomous and independent in relation 
to matter and that is why it does not perish when the matter, to which it is attached to 
and which it uses to perform actions, perishes. 
That is why the vital principle of an animal is "ethereal" and the vital principle 
of man (soul) is "spiritual". 
Man a spiritual-material being in which the spiritual principle and the material 
principle are so intertwined that they form one sole being. Man is not made up of 
186 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Let Me Explain 34 (Collins Fontana Books 1974). 
187 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 145-148. 
446 REVISTA JURIDICA U.l.P.R. [Vol. XLIII: 3: 419 
soul and body but rather is a unit of soul-body, is a sole reality, through which the soul 
gives the body a reality of a human body (when the soul goes away that body stops 
been a human body and it turns into a cadaver) and the body is the space-temporary 
performance of the soul, it is the being of the soul in the body. It should not be said, as 
a result, that man has a soul and a body, but rather that man is soul-body, is fully "soul" 
and fully "body", is an incorporated soul and an inspired body. 188 
1. Will 
The term "will" has various accepted meanings, for example: "Power of the 
soul, which moves an individual to do or not to do something", "Free self-
determination or free determination."189 But the most accepted definition, for this 
subject matter, is the following: a psychic faculty ofcarrying out the act of moving 
towards an object that intellegince has thought of and which presents as something 
good, as something useful, and the act of taking possession of the object, or the act 
of rejecting an object that intelligence has though and presented as bad, as something 
harmful." 190 Understood this way, will is identified as with its prerogative: the 
psychological freedom and the act through which it takes possession of an object is 
an act of "choice", it is a "volitio~". 
The functioning of the will depends on intelligence, affectivity, etc. in 
such a manner that the will sums up in itself all psychic activity of an individual 
and it is the end phase of all psychic activity. 
188 !d. 
The act ofwill is made up of three successive phases: 
• The introduction, by our understanding, of the "causes", in other words all 
of that which makes the will move to do something, to make a decision or 
reject a thing, to not make a decision. In other words the "pros" and "cons" 
which move an individual to act a certain way or another. In this phase, the 
individual examines, analyzes, values, compares the causes and the non-
causes. 
• The choice of one of those causes has as a consequence that the act of volition 
take place or not take place, in other words, that the will want or stop wanting 
something. And this depends on the "coloring", "tonality" of attraction and 
repulsion that the cause has. 
• The execution, which is a motor function derived from the cause that has 
been chosen. 
189 Diccionario de Ia Real Academia de la Lengua Espaiiola 1492 (1992). 
190 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 132. 
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2. Freedom 
Given the narrow relation between freedom and will, it is convention to mention 
that the word freedom has three meanings in the Bible: "1. The position of a free 
man as opposed to that of a slave; 2. The moral freedom of the will; and 3. The 
Gospel in as much as it is the "perfect law of the freedom" (SantI, 25 2, 12)."191 . 
In as much as the freedom of the will, the Old Testament knows that man ts 
free in other words responsible for his acts. 
'Now, let us look at freedom in marriage. Canon 1057, Section 2 states: 
"Matrimonial consent is an act of the will by which a man and a woman mutua.lly 
give and accept each other through an irrevocable covenant in order to establish 
marriage". 192 · · 
As it was stated in the previous point, will is the psychological power of"want", 
so that the "act of will" which makes up the matrimonial consent, is the same as an 
act "of want". If to that act we add that a fundamental attribute of will is "freed~m", 
which consists of the psychological power of doing "free" acts, or acts of"chmce"; 
then the "want" of the will, is an act of "choice", always considering "freedom" as 
an "internal" power of the individual. . . 
Act of will is a human act, or what is similar, the psychological and spectfic act 
itself of the human being as a human being; thus, a psychological act of the reason 
and of the freedom of the human being. 
The act of will is different, from those non-psychological acts, also referre~ to 
as "acts of man" and that properly are more "acts" than "functions", such as digestiOn, 
blood circulati;n. Functions that are carried out, within the individual, without the 
individual been able to intervene by way of his will so tas to determine if they can be 
carried out or not carried out. 
In so much as that psychological act, as well as those non-psychological act~, 
proceed from a specific individuality witl~ its ~wn n~me, bu~, so.lon~ a~ tlus 
psychological act proceeds from this indivtduahty ':'h1c~1 has r~twnahty and 
"freedom" and which distinguishes him from the trratwnal anunal, the non-
psychologi~al acts proceed from this individuality in whi~l: what he has in "common" 
with the irrational animal is the vegetative and the sensttlve. 
3. Freedom, Understanding and Feelings 
The act of "choice" is the specific act of the will, but it is not only the fruit of 
the will, but rather of the will and other capabilities among which understanding 
stands out. 
191 Serafin de Ausejo, Diccionario de !a Biblia 1097 (Editorial Herder 1963)- . , . 
192 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1. This definition that consent "1s an act ofth~ Will..· IS 
based on the doctrine of the Scholastic Philosophy, created by St. Thomas. Warnholtz Bustillos, supm 
n. 8, at 141. 
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Our understanding guides, but .the will chooses and in this choice is the 
fundamental point of the act of choice. We say that a person chooses something, 
when after becoming familiar with it, he desires it, he accepts it and he makes it 
his.193 
The act of choice requires the collective and harmonious intervention of various 
faculties, primarily that of understanding with the will. 
And these two faculties can inter-correlate by reason of their formal purposes, 
as are the "truth" and the "good". 
Having to consider that the "truth" is the "good" towards which intelligence 
tends to move towards with all of its strength; and that the will cannot want anything 
that is not presented as a "good" for the individual particularly in the specific situation 
in which the individual finds himself in. Everything that the will wants or desires 
must be covered in goodness; the good is, consequently, a cause and to be more 
precise it is a "final" cause (the "end") to which it should be aspired. Thus, evety 
"motive" that "moves" the will to "want" or desire must be a "good", but a contingent 
good which the will can accept or reject.194 
What is "truthful" is also a "good" and the "good" is also "truthful"; that is 
why the will can "move" the intelligence to think, to see better that which the will 
desires to be seen and, at the same time, what the will has desires to be seen, had to 
have been previoulsy thought by the intelligence. 
But we should not loose sight that under this multiplicity of faculties, dependent 
on each other, the fundamental ontological unity of the human being should not 
disappear; it is always the human being, all of the human being, who acts by way of 
his/her faculties. 
It is important to always keep in mind that the intellectual activity of man is 
closely linked to the activity of his external senses, which include sight, auditory 
capabilities, etc. as well as internal such as fantasy; keeping in mind that the senses 
produce the sensations. 
Now, we cannot think intellectually without the aid of the sensible 
representations supplied by the senses and elaborated by the brain; which should not 
lead us to think that man thinks, for example, with his brain, given that in reality 
man thinks with his knowledge even iflmowledge serves to think from the brain, in 
other words he uses it. 195 
4. Sensations and Products of Understanding: 
Ideas or Concepts and Judgments 
The essential acts of understanding are the ideas or concepts and judgments, 
same which "assume", as well as the other acts of understanding such as reasoning. 
193 Id. at 25. 
194 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 25. 
195 Id. at 26 
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The sensations and the ideas or concepts are qualitatively distinct, given that, 
as it was mention~d previously, the senses that produce the sensations, can only 
capture what is material, what is concrete, what is singular. In other words, while 
with my eyes I see many objects, all of them different from each other, with 
understanding I form the concept that recognizes the essence and the universal idea 
of said objects. 
And, how does understanding acquire that idea, that concept?: after the eyes 
have seen many concrete objects, for example trees, understanding make abstraction 
(this intellectual abstract operation is inherent in all cognitive process) of the 
particularities of said objects, in the example of those trees (some will be taller, 
others will be less taller, some will be thicker and others less thick, oak will have 
some characteristics and the pine tree will have other characteristics, etc., given that 
the understanding dispense of all ofthis) and forms the idea, the concept, the "tree", 
in other words the essence of the applicable object, the "applicable tree"; applicable 
to all of the objects, to all of the "trees" and not applicable to that which is not a 
"tree", for example a "rock". 
In these instances, the understanding has fom1ed the idea or the patiicular 
concept of the material realities, starting from the sensations; but understanding can 
form ideas or concepts of things, such as justice, beauty and kindness, etc., from 
which it is not possible· to obtain sensations given that they cannot be perceived by 
the senses. These (universal) ideas are the bases of the remaining operations of 
understanding (judgments, i·easoning, etc.). 
With only the idea or the concept of, for example, "a tree", understanding does 
not affirm or negate anything regarditig "the tree". This will be done by our 
understanding by way of another subsequent act which is called "judgment" and 
which is the most perfect act of oui·understanding. "Judgment'' can be "practical" or 
purely "speculative", according to whether it is guiding or whether, respectively, it 
is not guiding the realization of something in practical life. 
Now, how does our understanding proceed in order to arrive at a."judgment" of 
something?: it departs froin two concepts or id~as that it has regarding something, it 
discovers that between one and the other there is identity (and it affirms that identity); 
in the first instance it sees that the predicate is convenietit or that it cotTesponds to 
the subject, in the second it sees that the predicate is not convenient or not 
corresponding to the subject. 
This act of intellect from our "judgment" is entirely "conscious": the subject 
that creates it not ~nlyadapts itself to the ~bjective reality while creating it, but also, 
"knows" that it is adapting itself to that reality (the mind, only in our judgment, 
lmows that it is adapting to reality); the mind, adapting to reality, carries with it the 
idea that reality be "the measure" of the mind rather than the mind be the one that 
measures, in other words, it believes that reality; only by allowing itself to be 
"measured" by reality, the mind knows what is real. 
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In this act of"judgment" I also know that I am who asserts or negates, that I am 
different from the act of asserting or negating; which means that such act of our 
"judgment" is an act of the "psychological conscience" (or of our understanding) 
that perceives as its own the psychic phenomenon and the "I". With that act, the 
psychological conscience, which is a psychological faculty, with that act it shows 
me that, when thinlcing I conceive and when judging I affirm, "I conceive", "I think", 
"I judge", "I affinn"; in this act "I lmow that I lmow", "I am aware that I lmow"; in 
this act the "I know" converts into" I am aware that I know", in other words, the act 
of conscious becomes an act of self conscience. 
On some instances, things are not always as simple given that the "identity" 
between the subject and the predicate is not always immediately clear; hence, we 
need to make use of that comparative identity principle which, applied to finite 
beings, can be framed simply as follows: two tmly identical things to a similar third 
are tmly identical among themselves. For example, if X is identical to Z, andY is 
identical to Z, then X is identical toY (generally in mathematics what in metaphysics 
is taken in sense, in the sense of optical identity it is taken in a sense of equality: if 
X is equal to Z, andY is equal to Z, then X is equal toY); thus, we do not have three 
things, but one identical to themselves. 
The application of this comparative identity principle is the key to the human 
"reasoning"; the logical mechanism of the syllogism is in reaching to the knowledge 
of an unlmown tmth through its identification, in a third tmth, with a tmth already 
known: the soul is spiritual, what is spirihwl is immortal; thus the soul is immortal. 
In looking at the concept of"soul" and at the concept of"immortal", the concept of 
"spiritual" is identified- truths known- we deduce that the soul is "immortal". 
In the previous case, we started from two judgments (the soul is spiritual, what 
is spiritual is immortal) and, reasoning (on some occasions it will be "deducing" and 
in other occasions it will be by "inducing"), we obtain another judgment which 
affirms the identity between the concept of the "soul" and the concept of"immortal". 
5. Theoretical Knowledge and Deliberative Knowledge, which resolve 
the speculative judgment and, respectively, the practical judgment, with 
special reference to matrimonial consent. 
5.1 Theoretical knowledge, speculative judgment, required for matrimonial 
consent: 
5.1.1. The act of choice, which matrimonial consent consists of, is substantially 
an act of will, as has been stated previously, same which uncovers itself to the light 
of reason because the diverse objects or the diverse aspects of one similar object, 
among with which the will must choose, must be previously known by reason, first 
in a theoreticalmatmer and after in a deliberative mam1er. 
5 .1.2. And as for the theoretical knowledge of the matrimonial purpose, chosen 
by will and required for matrimonial consent to exist, Canon 1096, Section 1 clearly 
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indicates: "For matrimonial consent to exist, the contracting parties must be at least 
t · orant that maniage is a permanent partnership between a man and a woman no Ign . ,
196 
ordered to the procreation of offspring by means of some sexual cooperation. 
We should emphasize the following points: 
• That knowledge is required in order for consent to "exists"; . 
The phrase "do not ignore" needs to be understood as hav:n.g some 
knowledge, because "to ignore" is to lack all knowle.dg~' peiiam~ng to,~ 
particular thing; but to expressly demand that. the"partw;, .do .not Ignore , 
instead of expressly demanding that the parties lmow , mdicates that a 
minimal, vague, imprecise knowledge is sufficient; . 
• not to ignore that it is an "partnership" is, in some i·espect, not to Ignore that 
it is some "uniting bond"; . . 
• not to ignore that it is "permanent" is less than not to ignore that It IS 
"indissoluble" 
• not to ignore that it is between a man and a woman, is not to ignore, at the 
very least, that it is "heterosexual"; " . 
• not to ignore that procreation is produce by way of a certam sexual 
cooperation", is not to ignore that it does not come from any corporal contact 
and it is not to ignore the exact function of the sexual organs. 
5.1.3 It is not the same to "lack the minimal knowledge" than to "b~ inca~ac~tated 
to have that minimallmowledge: the first does not necessarily carnes wtth tt the 
second even though the second carries with it the first. 
I~ thereferred to Canon 1096, reference is made to the "lack" ofthis lmowledge, 
while the factof"being incapacitated", characterized as lacking su~ficient use of the 
reason is refened to in Canon 1095, Section1 and take note that this canon does not 
talk about lacking "all" use of reason, but rather lacking "sufficient" use of reason: 
the first canies with it the second, such as the bigger encloses the sma~ler, b~1t the 
second does not carry with it the first for the inverse reason tl~at the ~Igger IS not 
contained in the smaller. And in this, permanent causes can be mflu~:1ttal .such as a 
psychological diseases, as well as temporary causes, such as an ethyhc severe 
intoxication. 
5.1.4. The elements ofmaniage laid out in Canon 1096, Section 1 ~re less tl~an 
those pointed out inCanon 1057, Section 2 in formulating. what is marnage; wluch 
would make it seem that a vague and imprecise theoretical knowledge of those 
elements, pointed out in Canon 1096 Section 1, is no: ~uffici~n: for there to be_ the 
true matrimonial consent. This objection would be leg1t1mate tf, 111 order for there to 
be a specific maniage, it would be required for the~e to .b~ at~ c?1~sent ~o ~ach an~ 
every one of the essential objective elements of marnag~ mtts Jundt cal stgmficance, 
but that objection has no reason for being when all that 1s necessary for there to be a 
196 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1, at 345. 
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specific marriage is an implicit consent of those elements and when that implicit 
knowledge of those elements occurs when starting from the elemental theoretical 
lmowledge of the content referred to in Canon I 096 Section I, the contracting patties 
accept marriage as a whole, without excluding with a positive act ofwill, any of the 
essential objective elements of marriage. 197 
5.2 Deliberative Knowledge, practical judgment, required for matrimonial 
consent: 
5 .2.1 Assuming that the contracting party has the minimal theoreticallmowledge, 
it is necessary, in order for matrimonial consent to arise, that he carry out an act of 
"deliberative" lmowledge prior to the act of election. 
This "deliberative" act goes through various phases: the understanding begins 
to know "reasons" which give advice to the individual to marry with whom the 
individual is thinking of getting married and "reasons" that do not advice him to 
marry said person. These "reasons", of ordinary will, have relation not only with 
the marriage itself but also with both contracting parties. Afterwards, the 
understanding "compares" some and other reasons, carefully considering the 
different reasons, to see if some of them neutralize the others or at least prevail 
over the others; from this comparison the knowledge will arrive to the contracting 
party of whether said marriage hie et nunc is "convenient" or "not convenient", in 
other words, in the specific situation in which said contracting party finds him/ 
herself. And the conclusion to which the individual arrived to, is formulated by 
the understanding in a practical judgment, which presents to the will, this marriage 
"is convenient" or "it is not convenient". Evidently this whole process has been 
presided not only by the reason of the contracting party, but also by its preferences 
and tastes, by its needs, by its fantasies; and in this process has been present, not 
only that which is but also that which marriage carries with it, whether it is desirable 
or not so desirable, but also how is the individual and how is the other party, etc., it 
is evident that in said process the contracting party could have suffered mistakes, 
inappropriate acts, etc. '· 
In eve1y instance this process has been only a necessmy assumption so that the 
contracting party can make the decision of accepting or not accepting the marriage, 
assuming that he is free. Becatlse if truly marriage is free, this contracting party can 
negate marriage even when his understanding has advice him that he should many, 
as well as proceeding with a marriage when the understanding has present such as 
not convenient to the individual. 
5.2.2 In order that the mentioned contracting party can go ahead and carry out 
this process it is required that the individual have sufficient "maturity of judgment" 
or the sufficient "discretion of judgment". 
197 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 29-30. 
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It is necessary to distinguish between "discretion of judgment", which is the 
psychological capacity to do the act of "deliberation", and the act of "deliberation" 
itself. 198 
The "discretion of judgment" refers to the marriage in general and the act of 
"deliberation" refers to the marriage in particular, the first is a permanent or customary 
quality and acts as a previous assumption of the second, which is manifested with an 
actual character and it constitutes an intrinsic element of the volition; when the first 
does not exist the second does hot exist, but even when the first one exists the second 
one may not exist. For there to be matrimonial consent, "discretion of judgment" by 
itself is not sufficient, rather the act of "deliberation" must be present as well, and 
for there to be no matrimonial consent it is sufficient that the act of "deliberation" 
not be present, independently of the fact that there is an absence of the act of 
"deliberation" because there is an absence in the "discretion of judgment". 
5.2.3. A complete discretion of judgment is not required nor is an insignificant 
discretion of judgment sufficient; what is needed is discretion of judgment capable 
of producing the act of "deliberation" propoliionate to the object over which 
deliberation must take place. 
And this object is the essential object of matrimonial consent along with the 
contemplated extension in the Canons 1057, Section 2 and 1055, Section1, in other 
words: 
• the establishment of a partnership for a lifetime with multiple rights and 
essential obligations that go: 
• from those that are owed to the "substance" of this totius vitae consortium 
(Canonl055, Section 1) 199, within which the essential properties must be 
situated (unity, with which the "good of marital fidelity" is related to, and 
indissolubility) (Canon 1056)2°0 ; 
to those rights-obligations that are derived from the fact that this 
partnership for marital life is institutionally "order" to some fixed 
objectives (good of the procreation, good of the spouses) (Canon 1055, 
Section 1 )201 . 
5.2.4. Normally the grave defect of discretion of judgment will arise from a 
psychological grave anomaly, but what makes the marriage null is the "seriousness 
of the defect of discretion of judgment" and not "the seriousness hom which this 
defects comes from", such as the psychological anomaly; 
If the cause from which the defect comes is "grave", it can be assumed that the 
defect is also "grave"; but the hypothesis that even if the cause is severe the defect is 
not severe is not ruled out, in any case, the severity of the defect is measured by the 
198 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 31. 
l99 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1, at 335. 
2oo Id. 
201 Id. 
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incapacity of the discretion of judgment to produce the "deliberation" in proportion to 
the exposed object of the matrimonial consent. 
5.2.5. The discretion of the judgment is only the capacity to deliberate, as the 
terms "discretion of judgment" suggest. Nevertheless, if the required power to 
deliberate is missing the sufficient power to choose is not present, similarly where 
the proper deliberation is not present then the election is not present. 
It can be said that the absence of the required freedom and of choice, in this 
case, is a necessary consequence ofthe severe defect of the discretion of judgment, 
but it is not a component of this severe defect of discretion of judgment; in this 
case, what is common is to declare that the nullity of marriage consists of the 
severe defect of discretion of judgment, but not because of the lack of the required 
freedom. 
6. The Lack of Liberty, Autonomous Issue 
6.1 But today it is known that there can be psychic anomalies that, leaving the 
capacity of the intelligence to deliberate as is appropriate, affect the will, producing 
in her the incapacity to carry out the act of election, in other words, producing in the 
will the lack of capacity to elect, as well as producing also in said will the lack of the 
appropriate freedom. 
The distinguished author Juan Jose Garcia Failde "mentions that the psychiatric 
disorders of this nature are or can be neurosis, psychopathic personalities, the emotional 
disturbances, the un-restricted internal drives, the obsessive ideas. Due to one of these 
psychiatric disorders, that are directly affect the will, there have been Roman Rota 
judgments that have declared a marriage null for lack of freedom (intemal). 202 
It is commonly known, nevertheless, that according to classical doctrine, it 
was inconceivable that the will could fail when the understanding was not affected.203 
The thesis of ubi! intellectus ibi et voluntas, which was sustained by the scholastic 
philosophy, was used as a starting point to argue that only one disorder, in the act of 
understanding, can bring about a defect of the will and specifically Of the freedom 
(intemal). "204 
The least recent jurispmdence from the Roman Rota followed this thesis and 
declared null the maniage for a lack of freedom (internal) only when it was evident 
that the psychiatric disorder had prevented the practical judgment (today we would 
say, when it was evident that the severe defect of discretion of judgment had taken 
place) but not due to a lack of internal freedom understood as an autonomous issue 
or independent of the severe defect of discretion of judgment. "205 
202 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 33 (citing c. de Jorio, sen. 20 decembris 1967: SRRD, 59, p. 870). 
203 ld. (citing G. Michiels, De delictis et poenis, II). 
204 Id. (citing Jose Geraldo Caiby Crescenti, Falta de /iberdade interna e nulidade de consentimento 
matrimonia/2-344 (Tesis de doctorado, N. Domenici, Roma1990)). 
205 ld. at 34. 
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6.2. Instead, a sector ofthe doctrine206 maintains the thesis that in those instances, 
in which even where there exists sufficient discretion of judgment and the sufficient 
deliberation, a lack of the required liberty is produce, this issue of lack of sufficient 
liberty needs to be individualized as a autonomous issue of matrimonial nullity. 
This autonomous issue of a lack of sufficient freedom, points out Monsignor 
Garcia Failde, has to be supported not by Canon 1095, 2 but by Canon 1057, in other 
words.it must be considered as lack of the volitive aspects of that act of will which is 
matrimonial consent independently of the intellective aspects of that same act of will. 
In actuality, the freedom (internal) must be referred to the human act of consent 
and once referred to this human act of consent it can be taken in a broad sense, in 
other words, as a basic component of the consent in its agglutinative unity ofvolitive 
and intellectual elements, or it can be taken, as well, in a strict sense which is limited 
in the volitive aspects, independently of the intellective, of that same human act, if 
the dichotomy is valid "intelligence-will". 207 
7. The Act of Choice in the Specific Marriage and the Motivations of the Will 
7.1 Non-Pathological Conscious and Unconscious Motivations. 
7 .1.1. Lets begin from the hypothesis in which the will has "non-pathological 
conscious rational motives" to decide the specific marriage; remembering that such 
decision would not be free if the will has not had "motives" to decide not to go 
ahead with the maniage. 
Those motives, in favor of the decision of the will to go ahead with marriage, 
do not consist of the product of the studied understanding (universal ideal, judgment, 
reasoning, etc.) but rather in the "contents" of those products that the understanding 
presents to the will under the aspect of"good" and that fundamentally are fonned by 
the essential "goods" that in the lives of individuals are carried, generally, in marriage 
and for the individual that is looking to get married that marriage, patiicularly, carries 
with it. We are talking about the "values" (rights, natural ordainment, for example, 
to the good of the married couple, etc.) of marriage and the values "va]ues" (qualities 
that make it possible obtaining those other values) of the patiy one is seeking to 
contract specific marriage with. 
These motivations are evidently "rational" (because reason has though about 
them and they have been presented to the reason by the will), "conscious" (because 
they fonn pati of the field of psychological conscience- understanding- by way of 
which an individual feels affected by his/her psychic acts), "non-pathological" 
(because they are not the product of any type of psychopathological anomaly). They 
206 ld. 
207 See Id. (citing Juan Jose Garcia Failde, La Liberto psicologica e 1l Matrimonio, in L 'incapacita di 
Intend ere e Di Vol ere nel Diritto Matrimoniale Canonico 41-50 (Can. 1095, nn 1-2) (Editrice Vaticana, 
Citta del Vaticano, 2000)). 
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are not normally detem1inant "motivations" of the will towards marriage, but rather 
"motivations" which make it possible and facilitate the will to freely go into a 
marriage. 
7 .1.2. And along with these "motivations" there are others that, because of the 
previously mentioned reasons, are also "rationale, conscious and non-pathological" 
and that far from being incompatible are more complementary of the others: we are 
talking about the aims or particular goods which the contracting parties propose to 
obtain in the marriage. 
7 .1.3. But we must take something very important into account: that in the 
influence of the "rational, conscious and non-pathological motivations" on the will, 
whether it chooses to carry out or not carry out the act of choice, the "emotional life" 
of an individual plays a fundamental role, in which "feelings or affections", the 
"emotions", and the "passions" are included. 
If there is any difference that must be addressed between one or the other of 
these states, it can be said that the "feelings or affections" are states that express the 
particular moving-emotional resonance; thus, subjective through which the individual 
lives his own psychological processes; the "emotions" and the "passions" are very 
intense feelings, but the "emotions" are transitory and the "passions" permanent.208 
Eveiything that has been mentioned as part of the "emotional life" is something, 
perhaps, impregnated in the contents of the intelligence and the will, giving them 
"color" or "tonality" that fundamentally are "pleasant" or "unpleasant". 
From this point of view, the "emotional life" directs the understanding in one 
direction or another: if an object has, on an individual, a "coloring" or "tonality" 
emotional resonance of his pleasure, he will guide the emotions to the understanding. 
But if an object has, on an individual, a "coloring" or "tonality" emotional resonance 
not of his pleasure, he will distance emotions from his understanding; intelligence 
will try to discover how much of the emotional "coloring" or "tonality" is 
"pleasurable" (utility, convenience) and how much of the emotional ''coloring" and 
"tonality" is not pleasurable (no utility, inconvenience) an object of equal intelligence 
has in order to present it to the "will" as appetizing in the first instance and as 
"disposable" in the second instance. 
Similarly, the emotional life has great influence over the will because, besides 
the fact that a lack of orlimited emotional resonance deprive the will of one of the 
most impmiant impulses, wills feels attracted to choose among the motivations 
presented by the understanding, those which "coloring" or "tonality" are of its liking. 
This is nothing more than a particular case which generally happens in life: that we 
are inclined to accept what we like and disinclined to accept what we do not like, 
and within what we like we tend to choose what we like the most over that which we 
like the least. 
208 Id. at 40. 
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7 .1.4 Up to now we have referred to the "non-pathological rational and 
conscious motivations", let us now explore the "non-pathological non-conscious 
motivations". 
7 .1.4.1 The human being is frequently guided in his actions by a complicated 
group of "motivations" in which the "conscious", the "unconscious" the "semi-
. ' 
unconsciOus" and the "sub-conscious" intertwine with each other without the human 
being, in actuality and in many occasions, realizing with certainty where one of 
those phenomenon ends and where the other one begins. 
In order to explain the previous phenomenon, next is a reproduction of the 
concepts of Garcia Fail de: 
The "unconscious" is made up of all of those psychic contents that were 
never in the conscience or that one day disappeared and are unable to 
return to the conscious unless technical methods are used such as 
psychotherapy. 
The "subconscious" is made up of the entire psychic experience that is 
not present in the actual conscience and at the same time is made up of the 
"pre-conscious", in other words by those psychic contents that can make 
themselves present in the conscience by way of ordinary rational 
procedures such as a reflection or a deep introspection exercise, etc. 
The "semi-unconscious", which for some authors replaces the 
"unconscious", which to them does not really exist, is made up of all that 
which exists in the conscience, but it is dark.209 
7 .1.4.2. Let us look now at the "unconscious motivations" that "move" the will 
towards marriage. Immediately, the fdllowing question arises: how can it influence 
will if it is not in the conscience, which\as power and psychological faculty, it is the 
same as understanding; if nothing can \:move" the will without first having our 
understand~ng "know" such act as "good'1 ,and introduce such act as "good" by our 
understandmg to the will? 
This last part is tme: the motivation behind the want of our will is the known 
good; even the undeliberate act (such as feelings, affection, etc.), which "attracts" 
the will, and are mediums used by the tme rational "motives" to "move" the will do 
not emerg~ in .the will regardless of how necessary it is, except for when 'our 
understandmg mtroduces to the will "a good purpose". Then, and only then, and 
necessarily then does the will feel "attracted" to do the decided and elective act 
"moved" by the mentioned rational motives. 
It can be said that in order for any "motive" to influence the will it must be 
pres~nt, it must be felt, it must be lived, under the appearance of good, by the will, 
and It can be added that this does not appear to be anything more than the 
"unconscious" motive becoming "conscious". But in order for a "motive" to be 
209 Jd. at 42. 
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are not normally detenninant "motivations" of the will towards marriage, but rather 
"mot.ivations" which make it possible and facilitate the will to freely go into a 
marrtage. 
7.1.2. And along with these "motivations" there are others that, because of the 
previously mentioned reasons, are also "rationale, conscious and non-pathological" 
and that far from being incompatible are more complementary of the others: we are 
talking about the aims or particular goods which the contracting parties propose to 
obtain in the marriage. 
7.1.3. But we must take something very important into account: that in the 
influence of the "rational, conscious -and non-pathological motivations" on the will, 
whether it chooses to carry out or not carry out the act of choice, the "emotional life" 
of an individual plays a fundamental role, in which "feelings or affections", the 
"emotions", and the "passions" are included. 
If there is any difference that must be addressed between one or the other of 
these states, it can be said that the "feelings or affections" are states that express the 
particular moving-emotional resonance; thus, subjective through which the individual 
lives his own psychological processes; the "emotions" and the "passions" are very 
intense feelings, but the "emotions" are transitory and the "passions" permanent.2os 
Evetything that has been mentioned as part of the "emotional life" is something, 
perhaps, impregnated in the contents of the intelligence and the will, giving them 
"color" or "tonality" that fundamentally are "pleasant" or "unpleasant". 
From this point of view, the "emotional life" directs the understanding in one 
direction or another: if an object has, on an individual, a "coloring" or "tonality" 
emotional resonance ofhis pleasure, he will guide the emotions to the understanding. 
But if an object has, on an individual, a "coloring" or "tonality" emotional resonance 
not of his pleasure, he will distance emotions from his understanding; intelligence 
will try to discover how much of the emotional "coloring" or "tonality" is 
"pleasurable" (utility, convenience) and how much of the emotional "coloring'; and 
"tonality" is not pleasurable (no utility, inconvenience) an object of equal intelligence 
has in order to present it to the "will" as appetizing in the first instance and as 
"disposable" in the second instance. 
Similarly, the emotional life has great influence over the will because, besides 
the fact that a lack of or limited emotional resonance deprive the will of one of tile 
most impmiant impulses, wills feels attracted to choose among the motivations 
presented by the understanding, those which "coloring" or "tonality" are of its liking. 
This is nothing more than a particular case which generally happens in life: that we 
are inclined to accept what we like and disinclined to accept what we do not like, 
and within what we like we tend to choose what we like the most over that which we 
like the least. 
208 !d. at 40. 
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7.1.4 Up to now we have referred to the "non-pathological rational and 
conscious motivations", let us now explore the "non-pathological non-conscious 
motivations". 
7 .1.4.1 The human being is frequently guided in his actions by a complicated 
group of "motivations" in which the "conscious", the "unconscious", the "semi-
unconscious" and the "sub-conscious" intertwine with each other without the human 
being, in actuality and in many occasions, realizing with certainty where one of 
those phenomenon ends and where the other one begins. 
In order to explain the previous phenomenon, next is a reproduction of the 
concepts of Garcia Fail de: 
The "unconscious" is made up of all of those psychic contents that were 
never in the conscience or that one day disappeared and are unable to 
return to the conscious unless technical methods are used such as 
psychotherapy. 
The "subconscious" is made up of the entire psychic experience that is 
not present in the actual conscience and at the same time is made up of the 
"pre-conscious", in other words by those psychic contents that can make 
themselves present in the conscience by way of ordinary rational 
procedures such as a reflection or a deep introspection exercise, etc. 
The "semi-unconscious", which for some authors replaces the 
"unconscious", which to them does not really exist, is made up of all that 
which exists in, the conscience, but it is dark. 209 
7 .1.4.2. Let us look now at the "unconscious motivations" that "move" the will 
towards marriage. Immediately, the f~Hlowing question arises: how can it influence 
will if it is not in the conscience, which\as power and psychological faculty, it is the 
\ 
same as understanding; if nothing can '~move" the will without first having our 
understanding "know" such act as "good'1.and introduce such act as "good" by our 
understanding to the will? 
This last part is tlue: the motivation behind the want of our will is the known 
good; even the undeliberate act (such as feelings, affection, etc.), which "attracts" 
the will, and are mediums used by the true rational "motives" to "move" the will, do 
not emerge in the will regardless of how necessary it is, except for when our 
understanding introduces to the will "a good purpose". Then, and only then, and 
necessarily then does the will feel "attracted" to do the decided and elective act 
"moved" by the mentioned rational motives. 
It can be said that in order for any "motive" to influence the will it must be 
present, it must be felt, it must be lived, under the appearance of good, by the will, · 
and it can be added that this does not appear to be anything more than the 
"unconscious" motive becoming "conscious". But in order for a "motive" to be 
209 !d. at 42. 
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considered "unconscious" it is sufficient that the source from which it stems be 
"unconscious". 
There are some individuals that consciously feel moved towards marriage by 
the conscious, rational, non-pathological motives previously exposed. It can be said 
that consciously they feel "moved" to contract a concrete marriage because of the 
"ideal" of marriage and also because of the "ideal" of the pari with whom they are 
contracting this mmTiage; but at the same time they are persuaded to many by the 
unconscious "motives", that can be in harmony or not in harmony with this "ideal"; 
for example, in order to satisfy some of the unconscious necessities, such as the 
unconscious necessity to "depend" on another, to be "helped" by another, that, after, 
in the marriage, will lead the individual to constantly seek the support and the 
company of the other party. 
In this case the acceptance of this marriage, by the other party, has not only 
been the result of a matrimonial ideal freely elected, but also the result of an 
unconscious necessity; nevertheless, the undeniable sincerity and the apparent 
generosity of the other person. 
7 .1.4.3 It is undeniable that these "unconscious motivations" tamish the purity of 
the other "motivations" which are based on the matrimonial "ideal" and the personal 
"ideal" of the other. And it is also undeniable that those "unconscious motivations" 
can create difficulties while living together if tomorrow the parties do not find, in 
marriage, adequate satisfaction, also searched for by the carrier of the same. 
But in normal individuals, said "unconscious motivations" do not eliminate 
those others "unconscious motivations" based on the mentioned "ideals" and do not 
impede that those normal individuals accept marriage with the required "deliberation" 
and with the required "act of choice". 
7.2 Pathological Conscious and Unconscious Motivations 
7 .2.1 The same that has been said for the non-pathological unconscious 
motivations can be said of the pathological unconscious motivations: that the 
pathological motivations can be considered "unconscious" in so much !;:IS their origin 
is them is unknown, but that the pathological motivations can influence the human 
psychic in so much as they make themselves present and are felt as being present, in 
other words, as soon as they are recognized by the person that suffers them. 
7 .2.2. A motivation can be pathological even though its contents are not 
pathological, but in such a way that the manner in which it is present to an individual 
is pathological; and a motivation is presented to an individual as pathological when 
it has a tendency, sori of in a predetennined mal111er, to repeat itself in a way more or 
less automatic. 
In order to better understand the previous, it is convenient to cite Garcia Failde: 
"Let us look, for example, in the fixed ideas that characterize an obsessive neurosis; 
these ideas frequently do not have, in their content, a morbid character (let us think, 
for example, in the fixed obsessive idea, of eating or washing your hands), but they 
acquire this morbid character due to persistence and the ability to not be coerced 
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with which they present themselves, polarizing all of the attention of the neurotic 
and on certain occasions guiding its conduct against its will. 
7.2.3. The pathological motivations can be understood in an strict sense and an 
ample sense, to which Garcia Failde tells us: 
a) understood in a strict sense, they consist in specific alterations of the 
content of the thought accompanied by abnormal impulses; among them let us 
fit in the delirious ideas, the obsessive ideas and the overvalued ideas; the 
pathological motivations understood like this tend to make the practical 
judgment, the deliberation difficult or impossible, and consequently, the free 
choice or simply the free choice. 
b) understood in an ample sense, the pathological motivations include all of 
the processes that produce strong traumas in the psychic; thus, for example, 
the states of hesitation, fluctuation or doubt, conflicts between wanting, and at 
the same time, not wanting, characteristics of neurotic individuals; the violent 
traumatizing emotional states; those sihtations of irresistible impulses, that ask 
for a quick solution without leaving the interior stillness for the elaboration of 
the motives and counter~motivations of the election (which can occur during 
violent passionate situations); these pathological motivations, if they are severe, 
can greatly disturb the deliberative capacity; thus, the elective capacity or directly 
the elective capacity."210 
VI. Acts That Lead to the Creation of Matrimonial Consent 
In the previous chapter, while analyzing the elements that intervene in the 
makeup of matrimonial consent, we mentioned the habit of vivisectioning human 
beings into zones or sections, and once the division into zones of the human psychic 
and the acts of that human psychic, such as thoughts and volition, is understood, as 
purely artificial, we now go on to study, for pedagogic purposes, and separately, the 
principal sections ofthe human act and consequently of matrimoniq1 consent. And 
as we study these sections, an explanation will be given of what should be understood 
in Canon 109 5 as "lack of sufficient use of reason", "grave defect of discretion of 
judgment" and the inability "to assume the essential obligations of marriage." 211 As 
an introduction, the acts through which an individual anives to matrimonial consent 
can be synthesized in the following sections. 
Theoretical Intellectual Knowledge of what is niarriage and sufficient use of 
the reason; 
Deliberation and discretion of judgment. 
The act of free will. 
210 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, 44-45. 
211 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1, at 345. 
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1. Theoretical Intellectual Knowledge of what is Marriage 
and Sufficient use of Reason 
Knowledge, according to the biblical understanding, consists of"a personal relation 
between subject and object, in such a manner that to know (recognize) is a tenn that 
introduces us to the sphere of what can be experimented with, grasp with, felt."212 
1.1 All Theoretical Intellectual Knowledge begins with a sensitive 
knowledge. And its study begins by seen that there only exists that which 
is specific and singular. The specific and singular is something perfectly 
defined and distinct from other things or beings even though they are of 
the same i1ature as him/her. 
In the specific and singular, there are essential elements that only through 
reason do we discover them; and accidental elements that we capture with 
our extemal senses (hearing, sight, etc.). From this understanding ofthese 
sensitive concepts we can arrive at the knowledge, through our intelligence, 
not so much of "this "object but rather "the" object, for example not so 
much "this" flower (rose, gardenia) but rather "the" flower. 
And the question arises - how? 
First, making abstraction or doing without the sensible characteristics of"this" 
flower and of"this" other flower, which can be distinct from other flowers of similar 
specie or which can be distinct flowers of different species; and then entering into 
the essence, that is common to all flowers, because they make the flower different 
from those other objects that do not have this common essence (for example that a 
rose be a flower and not a book) and then expressing it in a universal concept or idea 
in the following manner: "the" flower. 
It is called "concept" because the mind "conceives" it and "universal" because 
it can be applied to all beings of a similar nature, for example, the concept of"flower" 
to all that is a "flower" regardless of its specie (rose, camation, etc) arid, within one 
specie, regardless of these or those characteristics (a big rose or a small rose, a red 
rose or a yellow rose). 
When ttying to shape the "idea" or the "concept" of marriage one must begin 
from the specific knowledge of this marriage, of this other marriage, etc., then all 
that makes this marriage and that marriage distinct is set aside (for example, that 
one person is rich and the other is poor, that one is happy and the other unhappy, 
etc.) and the individual is left with that which all marriages have and also that which 
differs from what is marriage; thus, forming the idea or the concept of"the marriage". 
Up to now, nothing has been asserted or denied about "maniage", it has not 
been asserted, for example "that marriage is this ... ", "that marriage is not this", in 
212 Serafin de Ausejo, Diccionario de Ia Biblia 365 (Editorial Herder 1963). 
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other words some type of judgment, has not been framed regarding "the maniage". 
In order to make this kind of judgment it is necessary to previously possess at least 
two ideas or concepts, and to compare one with the other until the individual finds 
out if one is suitable or not suitable to the other, and if it is evident that it is suitable, 
then the individual asserts that it is suitable, and if it is evident that it is not suitable, 
then the individual asserts that it is not suitable. For example, an individual has an 
idea of "maniage" and an idea of a "partnership for a life time"; the individual 
compares both of these ideas and discovers that one is suitable to the other thus 
' ' 
making the following judgment: "marriage is a partnership for a life time". 
It is clear that when shaping an idea and another, just like when comparing one 
with the other and realizing that one is suitable or not suitable to the other, an 
individual can make a mistake with the consequence that he also made a mistake 
when making an affirmative or negative judgment regarding the suitability between 
one idea and the other regardless of how subjectively said individual is that they did 
not make a mistake. This makes us remember the-constant issue of no coincidence 
between the objective truth and the subjective certainty. 
On many occasions we do not see reality "with" our eyes but rather "through" 
our eyes. And when looking at reality "through" our eyes, is seeing reality as it has 
emerged once it has passed through the filter of all that we are, of all that we feel, of 
all that we desire, in other words, once we have, in some way, shaped to our own 
image and resemblance; we think we are looking at reality truthfully when what we 
are looking at is our projection in that reality. 
When an individual makes the judgment: "matriage is a patinership of a lifetime", 
said individual is conscious of making that judgment. We are in the presence of the 
self-conscience by which that individual sees himself as· "aware" of that judgment. 
This lmowledge of been aware of knowing is exclusive to human beings and 
constitutes an unsurpassable barrier which separates the human from the animal. It 
not only consists of the reality that the human being is more than the animal (more 
conscious, more free, more intelligent), but also that between one and the other 
there exists a radical break through which the human being is other than the animal, 
is of a different nature than the animal. This emergence of the "I" as a self-conscious 
I is to go from the absence to the presence of one self, it is an emergence from the 
darlmess to the light. 
The ideas or the concepts, along with the judgments previously mentioned, are 
purely theoretical in so much that they remain in the theoretical world, without having 
a direct bearing in the world of action. But it is important to note that they are 
indispensible to making the practical judgments that are directly guided to carrying 
out actions in practical life. In conclusion without those ideas or concents and without 
' . 
those theoretical judgments, regarding "marriage", it is impossible to have 
matrimonial consent. 213 
213 Garcia Failde, supra n. 17 4, at 10. 
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Let us now look at the Canonist Legislature of such. Canon 1096 makes 
reference to these ideas or concepts and to these theoretical judgments regarding 
"marriage" when it says: Section 1 "For matrimonial consent to exist, the contracting 
parties must be at least not ignorant that marriage is a permanent partnership between 
a man and a woman order to the procreation of offspring by means of some sexual 
cooperation. "214 
To say thawithout this minimal vague knowledge there cannot be consent is 
not to say that with this minimal vague knowledge there can be consent, because 
even from the point of view of ideas and concepts and of the theoretical judgments, 
much more is needed in order for there to be consent as can be inferred from Canon 
1055 Section 1 and 2. 
But in order to have that minimal vague lmowledge of the contents of Canons 1096 
and 1055 Section 1 and 2 a "sufficient use of reason" is necessary, in other words, a 
degree of reason "proportionate" or "adequate" to the contents of those two canons. 
That is why an individual who, habitually or actually, in relation to the moment 
of the celebration of marriage, lacks, for whatever reason, of that degree of use of 
reason cannot have that minimal vague lmowledge; thus, cannot have matrimonial 
consent. 
Canon 1095 takes care of that lack of sufficient use of reason by pointing out: 
"They are incapable ofmatTiage those that: 1 lack sufficient use ofreason"215 , it is 
understood that this takes place at the moment that marriage is celebrated. And it is 
evident that, if those that lack sufficient use of reason are incapable, then those that 
lack all use of reason are incapable "a fortiori" as well. 
2. Deliberation and Discretion of Judgment 
The ideas or universal concepts and the theoretical judgments are not capable, 
by themselves, to move the will to want or reject something, given that someone 
that remains in that theoretical world, will not commit themselves t9that next step 
of accepting or rejecting marriage, which is the same as consent or tiot consenting 
to marry a given person. It is necessaty that the will feel stimulated by something 
distinct and this distinct thing is called "practical judgment"; and it is called 
"practical" because it is design to aid the will in deciding to do or not to do something 
in practice. 
This practical judgment is framed, by intelligence, in the following matter 
to all of those that are in the process of figuring out if it is suitable or not suitable for 
them to marry with a given person: "this marriage is suitable to you in the specific 
circumstances that you find yourself in" or "this marriage is not suitable to you 
because it is not good in the specific circumstances that you find yourself in." 
214 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1, at 345. 
21s Id. 
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But this practical judgment is the outcome of some prior meticulous activity of 
the individual's intelligence called "deliberation". The name "deliberation" itself 
tells us that we are dealing with something that is considered through different aspects, 
for example, its utility, its prejudices, risks, benefits/dtsadvantages comparison and 
for those that prevail, be able to come to the decision of whether something is 
convenient or not. 
When talking about something of great significance to life as is marriage, all 
individuals will proceed meticulously in making such deliberation. The individual 
will try to obtain as much information on what is marriage, of its rights and obligations 
derived from the marriage, of its purposes, etc. And if the individual decides to get 
married, he must be aware that he is not marrying an abstract marriage but rather a 
specific person. The individual will try to see if he can blend in or not with the 
person, for which he will examine how he is and how the other person is, their 
characters, their health, among other aspects. 
And he will have to conduct a comparison of what is convenient and not 
convenient, to him, in that possible marriage, and whatever the outcome of that 
comparison, the individual will judge whether to many or not marry the other person. 
It is appropriate to emphasize that this usually will happen, given that not 
always is the decision taken in a context of conflict of motives and counter motives 
' 
although there exists instances where the decision is made without hesitation. 
Regardless of how much effort is put into .that deliberation for the purpose of 
choosing correctly, acceptance of marriage will always be problematic because it 
will be a sort of jump into the abyss, given that nothing can guarantee, one hundred 
percent, that the choice was the proper one. In some instances those errors can serve 
to prevent the birth of a valid marriage, this in reference to the errors discussed in 
Canons 1097, 1098 and 1099. 
No matter how much is said about the will only moving as a result of something 
that the intelligence has presented as good under some aspect, it can be said that all 
choices, by the will, are also of interest. Let's remember how on certain occasions it 
is difficult for us to make a choice but not so much because we do not like that which 
we must make a choice from but rather because we lmow that upon making our 
choice we will have to give up choosing other things that we like. 
Retuming to the act of "deliberation", it is necessaty to add that said act will 
not be carried out by someone who does not have the sufficient psychic capacity to 
do the act. This psychic capacity receives the name of"discretion of judgment" and 
the same is "sufficient" when it is "proportionate" or "adequate" to the object or 
content of deliberation; object or content, that when dealing with whether to choose 
or not choose a specific marriage, is, as has been shown, the nahlre, purposes and 
essential properties of marriage in general, the characteristics that substantially make 
up the candidates to unite in matTiage (Canons 1097 and 1098); the lack of this 
sufficient or proportionate or adaptation of the discretion of judgment is expressed 
in Canon 1095 Section 2 with these words: "grave defect of discretion of judgment 
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concerning the essential matrimonial rights and duties mutually to be handed over 
and accepted".216 
It is clear that in these "essential matrimonial rights and duties" are included, 
along with the nature of marriage, from which those rights and duties come from, 
the essential purposes of marriage (the good of the offspring and the good of the 
spouses) and other essential elements (such as spousal fidelity) for which those rights 
and duties are ordered, and other essential properties of marriage (unity and 
indissolubility) that qualify those rights and duties. 
Let us not confuse "deliberation" with "discretion of judgment" given that the 
first is a result of the second. If "deliberation" is present it is because "discretion of 
judgment" is present, but it could be possible that the former is not present even 
though the latter is present, for example, a person that has the psychic capacity to do 
an act of deliberation does not do so because they do not want to do it. 
Just as in marriage, where neither discretion of judgment or "full or complete" 
deliberation are needed to establish matrimonial consent it is not required, for there 
to not be any matrimonial consent, that there be a "full or complete" absence of that 
discretion of judgment and of that deliberation, but rather all that is needed is for 
there to be a decrease in that discretion of judgment and that deliberation which 
entails that neither one of them is proportionate or adequate to the exposed object or 
content. 
Let us remember that the object and purpose of matrimonial consent is the 
same as that of marriage, with its essential rights and obligations. If a person cannot 
comply with those obligations naturally inherent to marriage, this is not due to a 
lack of purpose - given that purpose truly exists -; moreover it is due to a lack of 
capacity in the individual, in relation to the purpose. The impossibility of contracting 
does not have its origin in the purpose (the marriage), but rather in some kind of 
defect from the person wishing to be married. It is because of the contracting party, 
not because of marriage itself, that a marriage fails. Thus, incapacity is found 
exclusively in the individual. Canon 1095 is not concerned with those marriages 
that cannot be celebrated, but rather deals with those individuals that lack or are 
incapable of consenting and contracting a valid marriage.217 
Very well now, the grave defect of discretion of judgment, which prevents 
the necessary deliberation for matrimonial consent, can come from various causes 
that can be congenital or acquired, permanent or transitory, and can consist in 
psychopathological disorders or intoxications, among others.218 
216 Id. 
217 Janusz Kowal, Apuntes del XXXII Curso de Actualizaci6n Can6nica, Tomo II, 68 (Asociaci6n 
Mexicana de Canonistas 2008). 
218 Garcia Failde, supra n. 174, at 12. 
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3. Free Act of Will 
Without the previously explained activity of understanding previously explained 
(creation of ideas or universal concepts and theoretical judgments, deliberation and 
practical judgments) the act of free will is not even thinkable. 
It is known that said activity of understanding can be lacking even when the individual 
has sufficient use of reason and sufficient discretion of judgment to develop it. 
But the majority of times, that activity of understanding is absent because the 
individual has not been able to carry it out due to a suffering of insufficient use of 
reason and grave defect of discretion of judgment. In this case, it is clear that such 
absence is the product of insufficient use of reason or grave defect of discretion of 
judgment; thus, needing to include the absence of this free act in the causation 
elements of the "lack of sufficient use of reason"219 or "grave defect of discretion of 
judgment"220 referred to in Canon 1095 Section 1 and 2. 
There are other instances where the individual, regardless ofhaving developed 
that activity of understanding and having sufficient use of reason and sufficient 
discretion of judgment, cannot carry out that free act. 
This, according to clinical and experimental psychology as well as psychiatry, 
is possible because, given the inter-correlation existing between intelligence and 
will where if one is affected the other is necessarily affected as well, the existence of 
psychopathological diseases (such as those that entail irresistible impulses) have 
been proven that even if they do not deprive intelligence of sufficient use of reason 
and of the grave defect of discretion of judgment, they do not allow the will to carry 
out the free act; in some cases it will be extremely difficult to see if this incapacity of 
will is present or not present without intelligence been previously incapacitated for 
its own acts of use of reason and of discretion of judgment. 221 
But in the assumption that there is an absence of the required freedom without 
their been a prior absence of the required deliberation and hence the proportionate 
discretion of judgment, that absence of the required freedom can be an issue of 
"autonomous" matrimonial nullity which would not be included in the grave defect 
of discretion of judgment of Canon 1095 Section 2, but rather it would be based on 
Canon 1057 Section 2 which defines matrimonial consent as an "act of will" in 
' 
other words, that in the matrimonial consentits volitiv~ aspect stands out more than 
its intellectual aspect; contrary to Canon 1095 Sections 1 and 2 which emphasize 
more the intellectual aspect rather than the volitive aspect of the act of will. 
When talking about the actl\rity of the will in the realization of matrimonial 
consent we are talking about the psychological freedom seen in its actions through 
the specific act which is the "free" act or for that matter of its act of"choice" its act 
' ' 
of "self-determination". 
219 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1. 
220 Id. 
221 Garcia Failde, supra n. 174, at 13. 
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The act of choice is undoubtedly an act of self-determination, in as much as an 
act distances itselffrom self-determination the farther it distances itself from freedom. 
To self-determine oneself is to go through an act of indecision and 
indetermination to an act of decision and detennination. Self-detennination is present 
when the individual pawns his freedom choosing those means he believes adequate 
to obtain his proposed objective. 
We can self-determine ourselves so long as nothing, either internal or external 
to us, comes in our way, acts to prevent us from doing what we want or compel us to 
do something that we do not want to do, in such a way that in the first case we do not 
do what we wanted to do and in the second case we do what we did not want to do. 
Thus there is no freedom where the insurmountable constriction, which comes 
' 
either from the exterior or the interior, prevails. 
In most instances, it is not easy to measure the degree of freedom that an 
individual has in a detetmined situation, given that the human being is never "fully" 
free; rather, he is always subjected to influences which force him to carry out certain 
actions. 
Our freedom can be influenced by external coercive influences from other people 
or detetmined circumstances or by conscious or unconscious influential internal 
psychological causes (as is the case with obsessive ideas, delirious and disassociated 
ideas). 
Many authors (Saint Thomas, Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, etc.) have underlined 
the energy of several forces that shake the heart of a human being without him been 
able to always control them.222 
In all human activity, "freedom and necessity" are in permanent dialectical 
correlation: "determinism and freedom" are correlative. The idea of one arouses the 
idea of the other and vice versa. The union in us of the "determinism and of the 
freedom" is not only juxtaposition and alternation, it is a more intin1ate union. The 
"I" does not steer the natural.dynamism in the same rrianner that a horseman steers 
a horse. These dynamisms establish with the "I" one hui11an being. ~e "I" does not 
always sunender but it cmmot either distance itself to the extreme'of achieving 
perfect dominion. 
That is why at every moment, our real field of possibilities is always limited. 
Thus, the freedom within us is conditioned by many strange factors, such as 
heredity, character, complexes developed during our childhood, social circumstances, 
economic situations, among other things. All of our spiritual activity is influenced 
by inclinations, habits, etc. 
It can be said that we are not given to ourselves, we owe to ourselves. The 
vocation of a human being is to free the freedom of all that which prevents him from 
been free; that is why it can be said that freedom is not at the beginning but at the 
end, because the "capability to be", which is a characteristic of freedom is not in the 
222 Id. at 14. 
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beginning but in the end. Because the "capability to be", which is a characteristic of 
freedom, it is not so much a complete fact but rather a task to be performed with 
determination that is always renewed. 
But it is not always the case that when freedom is conditioned there is an 
"absence" of the necessary freedom to carry out the psychological act of matrimonial 
consent, given that to carry out this act a "full" or "total" or "perfect" or "immune of 
all influence" freedom that limits the freedom. 
Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between psychological "freedom" which 
is the freedom we have been refening to and "free act". The first is the psych~ logical 
faculty to carry out the second and the second is the specific act of the first. If the 
first is missing, the "psychological freedom", then the second one is missing, the 
"free act", but the first can occur without the second one taking place: the first does 
not exist because it is something abstract (there only exist concrete individuals who 
have or not have psychological freedom), on the other hand the second one is 
something concrete; hence, something that exists. 223 
VII. Reflections on the Nullity of Marriage Centered 
on Canons 1057 and 1095 
Canon 1095 Section 1 and 2, after establishing that those who "lacks sufficient 
S f ,224 d " 1 f'~" .t:: • • u e o reason an w 10 su 1er 1rom a grave defect of drscret10n of judgment"225 
are incapable of contracting maniage adds, in Section 3, that those that "are not able 
to assume the essential obligations of maniage for causes of psychic nature"226 are 
incapable of contracting maniage as well. 
In order to be able to contract for marriage, it is necessary to be able to assume 
"all" of the essential obligations ofmaniage. That is why someone that cmmot assume 
"any" of the obligations is incapable of contracting marriage in the same mmmer as 
someone who cannot assume even "one" of those obligations. Assume canies the 
same meaning as contracting an essential obligation or to compelled one self to 
something certain. . · .· ... 
An obligation is "assumed", is "contracted" by way of a psychological act of 
the will b~ which a person desires to assume or contract the obligation; thus, 
whomever rs unable to cany out the psychological act of matrimonial consent cmmot 
assume or contract the essential obligations of maniage and consequently those 
who lack the sufficient use of reason or suffer from a grave defect of discretion of 
~udgme~t cannot assume or contract the essential obligations of marriage. This 
mcapactty to assume, based on the incapacity of matrimonial consent by way of 
223 Let .us rem.ember that the psychological freedom is something internal to the human person, refer 
to section entttled FREEDOM in the chapter THE NATURE OF CONSENT. 
224 Canon Law Society of America, supra n. 1. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
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insufficient use of reason or because they suffer from a grave defect of discretion of 
judgment, is directly referred to as what is called marriage "in fieri" matrimonial 
consent and it is found within the incapacities of Canon 1095 Section 1 and 2. 
But an individual, even if they have the psychic capacity to carry out the 
psychological act of will with which an obligation can be contracted or assumed, 
said individual can be incapable to contract or assume said obligation if he is not 
capable of "complying" with the obligation. In this instance, the obligation, to the 
individual, is "impossible" because compliance with such is "impossible" and an 
"impossible" obligation is not a true obligation. In this instance, the inability discussed 
in Section 3 of Canon 1095 directly affects marriage "in fieri", in other words 
matrimonial consent (given that if the obligation cmmot be complied with, this consent 
lacks the necessary object) and the marriage "in facto esse" (given that during the 
development of the marriage "in facto esse" is where, in fact, the obligation cannot 
be complied with); thus, this hypothesis is different from the previous two hypothesis 
of Canon 1095 Sections 1 and 2. 
The effect of the three hypothesis of Canon 1095 is the same, in other words: 
the nullity of the marriage because anything that pretends to· consent must have the 
psychic capacity to "assume" the essential obligations of that consent, but an 
individual catmot assume an obligation when he is unable to consent to assuming 
that obligation and is unable to comply with the obligation. In all three cases, the 
underlying reason for considering a marriage void is the same: The lack of 
matrimonial consent. 
In the first two instances, Sections 1 and2 of Canon 1095, it is easy to understand that 
"consent" is lacking because the individual has not been able to psychologically do it. 
In the third case, Section 3 of Canon 1095, which discusses the incapacity to 
assume the essential obligations of maniage, the contracting party has been able to 
psychologically perform and perhaps has done, a psychological act of will geared 
towards contracting mmTiage, but that psychological act has not been a tmthful 
matrimonial consent because it lacks the essential matrimonial object of all matrimonial 
consent. In effect, that psychological act of will is different prior to been aimed at a 
cetiain object; when it is aimed at a certain object is when it is specified, given that the 
object specifies the act. It is only a psychological matrimonial act (matrimonial consent) 
when it is aimed at the entire essential matrimonial object, but it cannot be aimed 
entirely to the essential matrimonial object, if the author of such cam10t accept it due 
to his inability to comply with it. In this case, the matrimonial consent exists, (given 
that it is impossible for it not to), but if the individual is incapable of complying with 
that object, the consent of said individual cmmot end in said object. 
We reiterate that it is not that the essential matrimonial obligation, in itself, is 
"impossible" of been complied with, but that said obligation cannot be complied 
with by the pmiicular ii1dividualmore so than because of the condition of the same 
obligation, but for the condition of said person. It is thus that the axiom "nemo ad 
impossible tenetur" should be understood and which is applicable to our case. 
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Here we are talking about an inability to comply with the obligation and it is 
considered that an individual who has a extreme or major difficulty complying with 
it has such inability. If an individual has such inability to comply with the obligation, 
said individual will not comply with the obligation. But it can also happen that the 
individual does not want to comply with the obligation because, for example, he 
may not want to comply with it or because he might have some difficulty complying 
with it but not because he cannot comply with it. Nevertheless, the fact that he does 
not comply with the obligation, can in some instances, be a illustrative argument of 
his inability to comply with it. 
When we are talking about the incapacity to give and accept the essential object 
of marriage, at the moment of its celebration, it is sufficient that such incapacity be 
present at that moment for the marriage to be considered void even though once the 
marriage is celebrated the individual's incapacity disappears. 
The previous means that it is not necessary that the incapacity, at the time of 
marriage, be "constant" or "incurable"; thus, it can be said that an individual is 
incapable if at such time they cannot comply with the obligation even though they 
can comply with it aftetwards. 
Very well, what happens if at that time an individual is not incapable, but he 
has something during that time which will make his complianc'e with the obligation 
impossible from a given time prior to the moment of the celebration of the marriage? 
This situation can happen, for example, when the reason that is going to cause 
the incapacity is present at the moment of the celebration of the marriage, in an 
embtyonic state which progressively is deteriorating, or is present in a state of strong 
inclination that, little by little, will be translated into acts. 
The answe.r to the previous question is given to us by the distinguished author 
Garcia Failde: · 
I believe that in those acts, the contracting party is incapable of complying 
with the obligation because, even if at the time of the celebration of the 
marriage he has the capacity to comply for some time, at the \time of the 
celebration he has everything that, once that time has passed, will continue 
to make compliance with said obligation impossible when the obligation 
must be complied with. 
This is clearly evident if we are talking about the obligation of 
maintaining spousal fidelity which orders "semper et pro semper": 
someone, who for whatever reason, at the time of the celebration of 
maniage is faithful at the beginning of the spousal life but in the future , 
it not capable of been faithful every time that he must be faithful, which is 
evety time and at evety moment during the marriage.227 
227 Garcia Failde, supra n. 174, at 17. 
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I say the same about someone who, upon celebration of the marriage, 
is capable ofbeen monogamous during the early stages of the spousal 
life, but not continue to be monogamous in the following stages.228 
Ifwe are talking about those obligations whose compliances compels 
"semper sed non pro semper", in other words always but n?t in every 
ocassion, such as the obligation to have intimate sexual relatwns or any 
other right made up of in the so called "good of the spouses", I sta.te the 
same as in the previous cases, because, just as in the other hypothesis, the 
contracting party is already, at the moment of celebration o~the n:arria?e, 
incapacitated to comply with the obligation during those times m which 
the obligation must be complied with.229 
Canon 1095 Section 3 specifically deals with the incapacity to assume the 
essential obligations of marriage due to "natural psychic causes". Some others authors, 
among them Garcia Failde, do not like that the code talked about the "cause" of the 
incapacity because, among other things, to talk about that cause, the_Y say, lends 
itself to many misunderstandings and the cause is not part ofthe incapac~ty. no mat~er 
how much, during the procedural order, it is an element that helps know 1f mcapac1ty 
exists or not. 
Once again we tum to the author Garcia Failde, who regarding this topic, states 
the following: 
A cause of a psychic nature is not the same as a cause of a ~sycl~opat~o­
logical nature; for example, an eamed education Gust as havmg hv.ed m a 
matriarchal or patriarchal family environment) can create a mentality or a 
way of acting in relation to the spousal co-existence which ~an prevent 
the good of the spouses and nevertheless neither that ment.aht~ nor that 
way of thinking are, in and of themselves, psychopatholog1calm any of 
the multiple ways in which the psychopathological is consideredd;mt they 
can be considered as something psychic.230 
VIII. Conclusion 
Marriage precedes the Law; at least, the constmctive Law, given that it is an inh~r~nt 
,reality to the personal and social nature of the human being. The essence and charactenstics 
of its makeup are determined by natural Law. From here, ~ano~ Law made an 
extraordinary effort, unknown by the other judicial codes, to mvest1gate the ~atural 
demands of marriage, just as they are demanded by the dignity of the human be mg. 
22s Id. 
229 Id. 
23o Id. 
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Marriage is a complex human reality: it has dimensions that are extremely 
varied and broad. As such, marriage encompasses physio-biological, psychological, 
personal, social, religious, moral and judicial aspects. 
Consent is the only efficient cause of the matrimonial bond. It is generally 
accepted that the mutual consent ofboth of the contracting parties is what "makes" 
each marriage specific, not only in an "efficient" sense but also in a "formal" sense, 
using the scholastic terminology. 
Throughout this essay, with matrimonial consent as its fundamental point, all 
of the interceding elements have been explained, starting from the historical 
defi1iitions of marriage, the contractual and non-contractual theories of maniage, 
the basic principle of consent, its nature and those acts which make up its formative 
process. It ends with some reflections pertaining to the nullity of marriage, in light of 
the fact that the celebration of marriage can have no judicial effects if consent is lacking, 
which in summary, is the efficient, sole and ineplaceable cause of maniage, and 
therefore presupposes and demands natural, personal and inter-personal, absolute and 
relative capacity ofboth of the contracting parties (Canon 1057, Section 1 and 2). 
The important role played by the factual human sciences in the judicial study 
of marriage stands out, among them psychology and psychiat1y; but we should be 
conscious that these sciences, just like the human conditions with which they deal, 
are subject to change because its making is more subjected to the freedom of man. 
Science is intrinsically changing, almost all of the scientists today accept the idea 
that scientific knowledge is not "definitive" or "fixed" given that scientific truths 
are solely "provisional", as well as philosophically probable. 
One must also consider the cultural factor: culture, today, is not unifonn, but 
rather heterogeneous and unyielding to unity. From our cultural standpoint, it can 
appear that indissolubility is pmi of the matrimonial institution which, in and of 
itself, is based on natural law. But the acceptance of indissolubility outside of marriage 
is rare outside of the ChTistian culture. From our cultural standpoint, it can appear as 
if marriage should be based on the couple's personal commitment and should be the 
product oflove, but at the same time we know of cultures in which riianiage is based 
on paternal consent or in the contribution of the dow1y., If we do not want to negate 
the value of marriage on these other cultural levels, perhaps we should accept that 
our understanding is not absolute and universal. Immediately doubt can arise as to 
whether our principles respond to universal and absolute values or if they primarily 
depend on our cultural situation and evolution.231 
It is convenient to reflect on a basic requirement: the essential task for the 
Catholic lawyer to know the Canonical law, at leastthe material pe1iaining to marriage 
and its judicial ecclesiastical framework. 
Let us hope that this work is useful in creating awareness and in encouraging 
individuals to act in this necessity of additional education and that in some manner, 
231 Garcia Failde, supra n. 78, at 100. 
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the present subject, can be included in the curriculum of our Catholic Law Schools, 
illuminating these topics which, despite their importance and seriousness, regretfully 
remain distant from most of us. 
In conclusion, and for all the readers of this article, I want to conclude this 
article with a beautiful blessing by Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz: 
"May the Lord shower you not only with abundance of days but also with 
His blessings". 
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